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V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against 
defendant/appellant Prime Commercial, Inc. ("Prime"), on its counterclaim for a 
portion of the money earned by plaintiff/appellee Brent D. Mitchell ("Mitchell") for 
real estate development activities, when Mitchell agreed that any employment he 
obtained in connection with the real estate business would be taken in Prime's name. 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 828-29.) 
In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences 
are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Prime), and no deference 
is given either to the trial court's factual conclusions or to its legal conclusions. 
Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co.. 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Prime 
on its counterclaim for damages arising from transactions Mitchell made with Prime's 
former clients after being terminated from Prime, when Mitchell had agreed not to use 
"any information or materials gained for or from the files or business of [Prime]." 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 830-32.) 
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The standard of review is the same as that for issue number one, above. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
Defendant/appellant Prime Commercial, Inc., appeals from an order of the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, granting 
summary judgment against Prime on its counterclaim against plaintiff/appellee Brent D. 
Mitchell for breach of contract. (Order on Summary Judgment, R. 929-37, Addendum 
Exhibit ("Add. Ex.") 1.) After the trial court ruled that Prime's counterclaim would be 
dismissed, the parties stipulated to a final judgment resolving all claims (Order and 
Judgment, R. 926-28), and this timely appeal followed (Notice of Appeal, R. 943-45). 
Course of Proceedings 
Mitchell, a real estate agent, filed his complaint against Prime, a real estate 
brokerage, on September 13, 1995, alleging that Prime breached an agreement with 
Mitchell and claiming outstanding commissions of $20,544.69. (Complaint, R. 001-
011.) On October 12, 1995, Prime answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim 
for damages for Mitchell's breaches of the same agreement. (Answer and 
Counterclaim, R. 032-37.) In particular, Prime sought recovery of (a) proceeds 
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Mitchell had received for real estate development activities he had engaged in while 
employed by Prime, and (b) commissions Mitchell received for real estate transactions 
he engaged in with Prime's former clients after he was terminated by Prime. (Counter-
claim 1! 6-7, R. 036.) On April 19, 1996, Mitchell moved for partial summary judg-
ment on Prime's counterclaims. (R. 226-306.) After additional time for discovery, 
Prime filed its opposition to this motion on May 4, 1998 (R. 822-905), and Mitchell 
filed a reply memorandum on May 6, 1998 (R. 906-19). A hearing took place on May 
8, 1998, at which time the court orally ruled that the motion for partial summary 
judgment would be granted. (Transcript, R. 955.) A final Order and Judgment was 
entered on June 3, 1998 (R. 926-27), and two days later, the trial court entered its 
Order on Summary Judgment (R. 929-37, Add. Ex. 1). Prime's notice of appeal was 
filed on July 1, 1998 (R. 943-45). 
On August 3, 1998, Mitchell filed a motion for summary disposition. Prime 
filed its own motion for summary disposition on August 20, 1998. On September 4, 
1998, the Utah Supreme Court entered an order pouring the case over to the Court of 
Appeals, and on September 15, 1998, this Court entered an order denying both motions 
and deferring consideration of the issues until plenary presentation of the case. 
Statement of Facts 
Prime Commercial, Inc., is a real estate broker licensed to do business in Utah. 
(Agreement, R. 858, Add. Ex. 2.) In approximately January 1992, Prime hired Brent 
D. Mitchell to act as a real estate agent affiliated with Prime. (PL's Supp. Answers to 
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Def.'s First Set of Interrogatories, R. 890.) At that time, Mitchell had a real estate 
agent's license, but he had no experience in the real estate business. (Deposition of 
Steve Urry, R. 836:7-22, Add. Ex. 3.) Prime's principal Steve Urry therefore worked 
closely with Mitchell, teaching him the ins and outs of the real estate business. (IcL R. 
836:16 - 837:18.) Mr. Urry provided Mitchell with lists of potential clients, including 
potential sellers of income property and apartment property owners Mitchell could use 
for "cold calling." (Id, R. 836:22 - 837:3.) Mr. Urry also showed Mitchell how to 
write an earnest money offer, how to do an investment analysis of income property, 
and how to talk to clients about developing projects. (IcL R. 837:3-13.) 
Mitchell was also a member and manager of Red Point Equities, L.C. ("Red 
Point"). (Affidavit of Brent D. Mitchell 11 1-2, R. 297-98, Add. Ex. 4.) In 1994, 
while Mitchell was employed by Prime, Mitchell used Red Point to enter into an agree-
ment with Mr. Leonard K. M. Fong to pursue "real estate development activities." 
(Id. 12.) More specifically, Red Point and Mr. Fong agreed to purchase a parcel of 
real estate from third parties, develop it, and sell individual parcels to other third 
parties. (IcL 11 3-6, R. 298.) Mitchell, through Red Point, ended up receiving 
$15,000 for his dealings with Mr. Fong. (Id, 1 9, R. 299.) 
On January 1, 1994, Prime and Mitchell had entered into a written agreement 
setting forth the terms of their association. (Agreement, R. 858-64, Add. Ex. 2.) 
Paragraph eleven of this agreement specifically provided that all of Mitchell1 s real 
estate work would be done through Prime: 
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In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of property, 
and all employment in connection with the real estate business shall be 
taken in the name of Broker. 
(Id. 1 11, R. 860.) The agreement also required commissions from real estate activities 
to be split according to a specific formula set forth in the contract. (Id, 1 6, R. 859.) 
Nevertheless, Mitchell did not inform Prime about the Fong project. One of Prime's 
secretaries, however, noticed that Mitchell had been using Prime's letterhead and 
secretarial staff in furtherance of his activities, and she told Mr. Urry. (Urry Dep., R. 
845:7-15, Add. Ex. 3.) Mr. Urry discussed the matter with Mitchell, and Mitchell 
agreed that what he was doing was wrong, and that Prime should have been involved in 
the project. (KL R. 845:16 - 846:1, 847:14-21.) Mitchell therefore agreed that Prime 
would be paid half of the commissions and/or profits Mitchell received from the Fong 
project. (IcL R- 845:22-24.) However, Mitchell later reneged on this agreement and 
refused to pay Prime its share of the proceeds received from Mr. Fong. (IcL R. 845:24 
-846:1.) 
On approximately August 31, 1994, Prime terminated Mitchell's employment. 
(Id. R. 844:14-20.) Paragraph eighteen of the Mitchell-Prime agreement specifically 
precluded Mitchell from using information and materials obtained through his assoc-
iation with Prime: 
Agent shall not, after termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's own 
advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, any 
information or materials gained for or from the files or business of 
Broker. 
(Agreement 1 18, R. 861, Add. Ex. 2.) Nevertheless, Mitchell engaged in numerous 
real estate transactions with Prime's clients after being terminated. (Mitchell Dep., R. 
879:1-23, 881:7 - 882:9, 883:5-24, 884:3-14, 885:25 - 886:2, Add. Ex. 5; Plaintiff's 
Supp. Answers to Interrogatories 1 6, R. 891-98; Urry Dep., R. 849:2-23, Add. Ex. 
3.) In his deposition, Mitchell admitted that he learned of the existence of at least three 
clients, and of the properties they were selling, through his work at Prime. (Mitchell 
Dep., R. 879:4-23, 881:7-25, 882:3-9.) Mitchell also admitted that he had used 
financial statements and other information obtained from his work at Prime. (IcL 881:9-
25.) At the time of his termination, Mitchell was also in possession of a computer-
generated list of prospective apartment sellers that Prime had previously compiled at its 
own expense. (Urry Dep., R. 856:8-17.) 
Prime's counterclaim against Mitchell sought setoffs under two theories. First, 
Prime sought a setoff for its share of the money Mitchell earned from the Fong project, 
which he had engaged in while supposedly working exclusively for Prime. Prime 
sought recovery under paragraph eleven of the agreement, quoted earlier, in which 
Mitchell agreed that all employment in connection with the real estate business would 
be taken on behalf of Prime. Second, Prime sought damages for Mitchell's breach of 
paragraph eighteen of the agreement, in which Mitchell agreed not to use Prime's 
materials for his own benefit. Prime requested that it be paid a portion of the 
commissions Mitchell earned from the transactions he completed in violation of 
paragraph eighteen. 
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In his motion for partial summary judgment on Prime's counterclaim, Mitchell 
asserted that both of Prime's claims were barred by the agreement. Regarding the 
Fong project, Mitchell did not present any evidence or argument that his real estate 
development activities did not constitute "employment in connection with the real estate 
business" under paragraph eleven of the agreement. (Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 235-37.) Instead, Mitchell claimed in his 
affidavit that (1) his Fong activities were "independent of" his broker-agent relationship 
with Prime, (2) there was no listing agreement in connection with the Fong project, (3) 
the money he received from the Fong project was for his joint venture interest, and not 
for commissions on the sale of units, and (4) his work on the Fong project did not 
involve any of the activities mentioned in paragraph four of the agreement. (Mitchell 
Aff. 11 2, 5, 9, 10, R. 297-99, Add. Ex. 4.) Paragraph four of the agreement states as 
follows: 
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and 
use Agent's best efforts to sell, lease, or rent any and all real estate listed 
with Broker, to solicit additional listings and customers for Broker and 
otherwise promote the business of serving the public in real estate 
transactions to the end that each of the parties to this Agreement may 
derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit 
particular listings or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do 
so. Agent agrees to perform no other activities in association with 
Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases, 
representation agreements or management contracts] of property, for the 
parties' mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the 
ethical and professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this 
Agreement. 
(Agreement 1 4, R. 859, Add. Ex. 2.) 
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Regarding Prime's claim for the post-termination commissions Mitchell earned 
from transactions with Prime's customers, Mitchell did not deny violating paragraph 
eighteen of the agreement by using "information or materials gained for or from the 
files or business of Broker." Mitchell could testify only that he did not receive com-
missions from three specific listings that were active when he was terminated by Prime. 
(Mitchell Aff. 11 11-15, R. 299-300, Add. Ex. 4.) Mitchell asserted instead that 
paragraph eighteen was unenforceable because it was a covenant not to compete, and 
because it lacked any explicit geographical or time limitations. (Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 237-39.) 
In its opposition to the summary judgment motion, Prime pointed out that the 
agreement specifically required Mitchell to take all "employment in connection with the 
real estate business" in Prime's name, and Prime submitted evidence from two 
witnesses explaining that the real estate "development" activities involved in the Fong 
project constituted employment in connection with the real estate business, and was 
therefore subject to paragraph eleven of the agreement. (Urry Dep., R. 838:11 -
842:15, Add. Ex. 3; Affidavit of William K. Martin 1 4, R. 876-77, Add. Ex. 6.) 
Prime also pointed out that Mitchell had expressly agreed to pay Prime half of the Fong 
proceeds. 
Finally, Prime explained that paragraph eighteen was not a "covenant not to 
compete" because it did not require Mitchell to refrain from competing. (Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 831.) Prime also presented 
evidence of Mitchell's post-termination real estate transactions with Prime's clients, and 
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Prime presented evidence that the standard in the real estate industry generally requires 
a real estate agent to compensate a former broker for transactions made with that 
broker's clients for up to a year after termination. (Urry Dep., R. 849:24 - 855:20, 
Add. Ex. 3; Martin Aff. 11 5-8, R. 877-78, Add. Ex. 6.) 
The trial court granted both portions of Mitchell's motion for partial summary 
judgment. (Order on Summary Judgment, R. 929-37, Add. Ex. 1.) The court con-
cluded that Mitchell's duties were limited to those addressed in paragraph four of the 
agreement, i.e., soliciting and obtaining listings and sales, leases, representation agree-
ments and management contracts. (Id, 1 2, R. 935.) The court therefore held that 
Prime was not entitled to recover any of the proceeds from the Fong project. (Id 1 4, 
R. 935-36.) The court did not address paragraph eleven of the agreement at all. (See 
id) The court further concluded that paragraph eighteen constituted a total prohibition 
on competition from Mitchell, and was unenforceable because it did not contain an 
explicit time or geographical limitation. (Id 11 5-7, R. 936.) Finally, the court also 
concluded that the agreement itself was an integrated contract and was unambiguous. 
(Id 11 1,4, 5,6, R. 935-36.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in both portions of its summary judgment ruling. First, the 
court erred in dismissing Prime's claim for its share of the Fong proceeds under 
paragraph eleven of the parties' agreement. The plain language of paragraph eleven 
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required Mitchell to take "all employment in connection with the real estate business" 
in Prime's name, and real estate development activities clearly constitute employment 
in connection with the real estate business. Whether the real estate development 
activities were specifically mentioned in paragraph four is irrelevant, because Prime is 
not relying on paragraph four as its basis for relief. Moreover, there is nothing in the 
contract that states or implies that the list of activities mentioned in paragraph four was 
meant to be a limitation on paragraph eleven. At the very least, it is reasonable to 
conclude that "employment in connection with the real estate business" includes 
Mitchell's real estate development activities, and therefore the agreement is ambiguous, 
and summary judgment is inappropriate. 
Similarly, the trial court erred in refusing to enforce Mitchell's agreement not to 
use materials and other information obtained from Prime's files. The trial court 
concluded that paragraph eighteen constituted a blanket covenant not to compete, but 
this conclusion was incorrect, as nothing in paragraph eighteen prevents Mitchell from 
competing with Prime. Instead, paragraph eighteen merely provides that Mitchell 
cannot use Prime's customer list and other proprietary materials for Mitchell's own 
benefit. Such a limited restriction is clearly enforceable under Utah law. At any rate, 
as with paragraph eleven, the issue here is simply whether Prime's proposed inter-
pretation of paragraph eighteen is reasonable; if it is reasonable to read paragraph 
eighteen simply as a limitation on Mitchell's use of specific information, the summary 
judgment must be reversed. 
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Because paragraph eighteen is not a covenant not to compete, the fact that it 
lacks express geographical or durational limitations does not render it unenforceable. 
In addition, even if such limitations were required, they should be implied into the 
contract based on the inherent nature of the restrictions and the course of dealing of the 
real estate industry, as Utah law clearly requires that contractual provisions be con-
strued wherever possible so as to make them enforceable. Finally, even if paragraph 
eighteen must as a matter of law be construed as a covenant not to compete, the 
provision should be enforced to the extent the covenant is reasonable, and the 
agreement certainly is reasonable as applied in this instance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIME WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO A PORTION OF THE COMMISSIONS MITCHELL EARNED 
FROM HIS REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES 
Pursuant to paragraph eleven of the parties' agreement, Prime Commercial was 
entitled to a portion of the commissions Mitchell earned through Red Point Equities 
from the real estate development activities he undertook with Mr. Fong. Paragraph 
eleven required all employment in connection with the real estate business to be taken 
in Prime's name, and Mitchell's development activities plainly constituted employment 
in connection with the real estate business. Paragraph four of the agreement does not 
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require a contrary result. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment on this portion of 
Prime's counterclaim should be reversed. 
A. The grant of summary judgment must be reversed as long as the agreement 
can reasonably be construed in Prime's favor. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if 
the moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and [2] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). For summary judgment to be proper, the moving party must submit sufficient 
evidence or otherwise establish its right to judgment. The moving party has an "affirm-
ative burden," Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993), 
and if the moving party fails to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the motion must be denied. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 
(Utah 1996) (because moving party's affidavit failed to negate existence of disputed 
issue of fact, nonmoving party had no burden to present evidence in response on that 
issue); see also Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co.. Case No. 970569, slip op. at 
(Utah Dec. 29, 1998) (because moving party did not present evidence on key issue, 
"there remain disputed issues of material fact and summary judgment is not 
appropriate"). 
Therefore, Prime is not required to prove that the trial court's interpretation of 
the agreement is incorrect, or even that the court's interpretation of the agreement is 
unreasonable. Instead, Prime need only show that its own interpretation of the agree-
ment is reasonable. If there is a reasonable construction of the agreement that would 
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enable Prime to recover, then the grant of summary judgment would have to be re-
versed, even if the trial court's interpretation were also reasonable. If an agreement is 
subject to two reasonable or tenable interpretations, then the agreement is ambiguous, 
and the trial court must consider extrinsic evidence in determining the meaning actually 
intended by the parties.1 E.g., R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus.. 936 P.2d 
1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). In other words, because the agreement is reasonably sus-
ceptible to Prime's reading, Mitchell has not established that he is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See, e.g.. id. (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983)) ("'[A] motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal 
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue 
as to what the parties intended.'"). 
B. Mitchell's real estate development activities were required to be taken in 
Prime's name under paragraph eleven of the agreement. 
Prime's argument on this point is quite simple: (1) Paragraph eleven of the 
agreement unequivocally requires Mitchell to take "all employment in connection with 
the real estate business" in Prime's name. (Agreement 1 11, R. 860, Add. Ex. 2.) (2) 
Mitchell's real estate development activities constituted employment in connection with 
the real estate business. Therefore, (3) paragraph eleven of the agreement required 
Mitchell's development activities to be taken in Prime's name. Prime is therefore 
entitled to its share of the proceeds from the development activities. 
1
 Of course, if Prime's interpretation is the only reasonable one (i.e., if the trial 
court's reading is unreasonable), then Prime's interpretation must control as a matter of 
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C. Paragraph four of the agreement does not prevent Prime from recovering its 
share of the commissions and proceeds earned by Mitchell from the Fong 
project. 
The trial court never directly addressed whether real estate development activ-
ities constitute "employment in connection with the real estate business" under para-
graph eleven of the agreement. Indeed, the trial court's conclusions of law do not even 
mention paragraph eleven. (Order on Summary Judgment, R. 935-36, Addendum 
Exhibit 1.) Instead, the trial court denied Prime its right to commissions because it 
concluded that Mitchell's activities were not included within the purview of paragraph 
four of the agreement, in which Mitchell agreed "to perform no other activities in 
association with Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases, repre-
sentation agreements or management contracts] of property." (Agreement f 4, R. 
859, Add. Ex. 2.) The trial court apparently reasoned that the list of activities pre-
sented in paragraph four defines "employment in connection with the real estate busi-
ness" as that phrase appears in paragraph eleven, so that any activities outside the scope 
of paragraph four would necessarily fall outside the scope of paragraph eleven. 
As discussed in subsection A above, Prime is not required to prove that the trial 
court's interpretation is incorrect, or even that such an interpretation is unreasonable. 
Instead, as the party opposing summary judgment, Prime need only show that its own 
interpretation of the agreement is reasonable. That is, as long as it would be reasonable 
to conclude that Mitchell's development activities constituted "employment in connec-
law, and the summary judgment still would have to be reversed. 
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tion with the real estate business" under the agreement, the summary judgment will 
have to be reversed. 
1. The plain language of the agreement demonstrates that Prime's 
interpretation of the agreement is reasonable. 
Prime submits that its interpretation of the agreement, that real estate develop-
ment activities constitute "employment in connection with the real estate business," is 
clearly reasonable. First, regardless of what may appear in paragraph four, the plain 
language of paragraph eleven itself obviously covers Mitchell's "development" activ-
ities. Real estate development consists of things such as buying real property, 
improving real property, managing real property, and selling or leasing real property. 
All of these activities are plainly connected to the real estate business. Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine how real estate development could not be considered employment in 
connection with the real estate business. It must certainly at least be reasonable to 
interpret a contract according to its plain meaning. 
As noted above, the trial court apparently concluded that the list of activities in 
paragraph four was intended as a definition of "real estate business" in paragraph 
eleven, and that only those transactions specifically listed in paragraph four constitute 
"employment in connection with the real estate business." But neither the language nor 
the structure of the agreement support this interpretation. Or, more importantly, 
nothing in the language or structure of the agreement requires such an interpretation. 
To the contrary, the "all employment" language used in paragraph eleven is much 
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broader than the specific language used in paragraph four, and it is reasonable to 
conclude that because different language was used, different coverage was intended. 
2. Logic and fairness also support Prime's proposed interpretation of 
paragraph eleven. 
In addition, there are perfectly good reasons why paragraph eleven would be 
intended to have a broader meaning than paragraph four. First, a broader paragraph 
eleven is necessary to balance out the obligations imposed by the agreement. Without 
paragraph eleven, the parties' obligations under the agreement are tilted heavily in the 
agent's favor. Under the agreement, the broker is obligated to give the agent all 
current listings, as well as all prospective listings if the agent wishes. (Agreement 1 1, 
R. 858, Add. Ex. 2.) The broker also must provide the agent with any "advice, 
information, and full cooperation" the agent requests. (IdL 12.) The broker is even 
required to provide the agent with office facilities. (IcL 1 3, R. 859.) 
However, the broker has almost no control over the agent. The broker may not 
require an agent to service a particular listing or call on a particular client, and the 
broker has no right to direct the agent's working hours, floor time, or vacation time. 
(Id. fl 1, 2, 4, R. 858-59.) In other words, the broker is required to provide a great 
deal of support, but the agent is not obligated to do anything in return. Indeed, the 
agent is even free to decide not to work at all. Thus, the only consideration the broker 
receives in exchange for the support it provides is the right to receive a share of the 
commissions from any employment the agent undertakes in connection with the real 
estate business. 
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The broader scope of paragraph eleven also reduces uncertainty regarding the 
parties' obligations and may help protect a broker from fraud or sharp practices 
committed by an unscrupulous agent. If a broker's right to payment were strictly 
limited to the narrow list of transactions set forth in paragraph four, then an agent could 
avoid sharing his or her commissions simply by structuring transactions in a certain 
way. A great deal of litigation would ensue over whether a certain transaction con-
stituted a "listing," a "sale," or some other arrangement. However, a broader para-
graph eleven makes the parties' contractual obligations much clearer and provides less 
of an opportunity or a temptation for an agent to attempt to defraud his or her broker. 
As long a transaction constitutes "employment in connection with the real estate 
business," the proceeds must be shared with the broker. 
3. Prime's extrinsic evidence also establishes that Prime's proposed 
interpretation of paragraph eleven is reasonable. 
Finally, the extrinsic evidence submitted to the trial court by Prime also supports 
Prime's reading of the agreement. The Utah Supreme Court has held that extrinsic 
evidence must be considered in determining whether a party's proposed interpretation 
of a contract is reasonable, even if the contract appears unambiguous on its face. Ward 
v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264, 267-68 (Utah 1995). As the court 
explained, "[w]hen determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence 
must be considered." Id. at 268 (emphasis added). 
Two witnesses with experience in the real estate industry directly testified that 
real estate development constitutes employment in connection with the real estate bus-
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iness and is covered by paragraph eleven of the agreement. (Urry Dep., R. 838:11 -
839:4, 840:9 - 841:1, 841:18 - 842:15, 843:1-25, Add. Ex. 3; Martin Aff. 1 4, R. 876-
77. Add. Ex. 6.) Further, Mitchell himself even acknowledged that his real estate 
development activities were covered by the agreement and that Prime was entitled to a 
portion of the profits he was making through those activities. (Urry Dep., R. 845:3 -
846:16, 847:14-21.) This evidence, along with the plain language of paragraph eleven 
itself, demonstrates that the agreement is at least "reasonably susceptible" to Primefs 
interpretation, and that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Prime is entitled to a 
portion of the money Mitchell received from his real estate development activities with 
Fong. 
D. The grant of summary judgment on this portion of Prime's counterclaim 
should be reversed. 
Ultimately, paragraph four is irrelevant. That is, it does not matter whether 
Mitchell agreed in paragraph four to engage in real estate activities other than soliciting 
or obtaining listings and sales, or even whether paragraph four required Mitchell to 
refrain from engaging in these other activities. The fact remains that Mitchell clearly 
did engage in other activities connected to the real estate business. The fact also 
remains that Mitchell agreed that "all" employment he obtained in connection with the 
real estate business would be taken in Prime's name. Therefore, Prime is entitled to a 
fair share of the money Mitchell earned from his development activities. 
Allowing the summary judgment to stand would sanction an injustice. When 
Mitchell, who had no previous real estate experience, was hired by Prime, he agreed to 
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take all real estate employment in Prime's name, and to ensure that Prime received its 
share of the commissions earned in such activities. Instead, while working at Prime's 
office and while using Prime's facilities, Mitchell attempted to engage in "independent" 
real estate activities for his own personal profit, without sharing with Prime. When 
Prime found out about it, Mitchell then promised that he would in fact split the pro-
ceeds with Prime, just as he had originally agreed when he signed the contract. Then, 
Mitchell turned around and refused to live up to his word. Enough is enough. 
Mitchell's activities were clearly governed by paragraph eleven of his agreement with 
Prime, and as such he was required to involve Prime in those activities. At the very 
least, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether those activities fall within the 
contract. Either way, the summary judgment on this point should be reversed. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE MITCHELLS 
AGREEMENT NOT TO USE MATERIALS AND OTHER INFORMATION 
OBTAINED FROM PRIMES FILES AND BUSINESS 
The trial court also erred in holding that Mitchell was free to use the customer 
lists and other proprietary information he obtained from Prime, notwithstanding 
Mitchell's express agreement not to do so. In paragraph eighteen of the agreement, 
Mitchell agreed that he would not 
use to [his] own advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or 
corporation, any information or materials gained for or from the files or 
business of [Prime]. 
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(Agreement 1 18, R. 861, Add. Ex. 2 (emphasis added).) Nevertheless, Mitchell flag-
rantly disregarded this provision and engaged in numerous real estate transactions with 
Prime's clients after being terminated by Prime. (Mitchell Dep., R. 879:1-23, 881:7 -
882:9, 883:5-24, 884:3 - 14, 885:25 - 886:2, Add. Ex. 5; Plaintiffs Supp. Answers to 
Interrogatories 1 6, R. 891-98; Urry Dep., R. 849:2-23, Add. Ex. 3.)2 
The trial court held that Prime was not entitled to any relief for Mitchell's 
breach of paragraph eighteen, concluding that paragraph eighteen was a covenant not to 
compete and was unenforceable on the ground that it lacked any explicit time or geo-
graphical limitations. This characterization is erroneous, however; paragraph eighteen 
is not a covenant not to compete, because it does not restrict competition. Instead, 
paragraph eighteen simply prevents Mitchell from using specific proprietary informa-
tion developed by Prime, and restrictions such as these are plainly enforceable. The 
trial court's grant of summary judgment on this point should therefore be reversed. 
A. A restriction on contacting an employer's former customers is enforceable, 
even in situations where a covenant not to compete would be barred. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an employee may be prevented from 
using customer leads gained from a former employer, even in situations where a 
covenant not to compete would be unenforceable. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 
625-27 (Utah 1982). In Robbins. a hearing aid salesman was given a list of prospects 
2
 Mitchell admitted that, through his work at Prime, he learned of the existence 
of clients, the properties they were selling, and their financial statements and other 
information. (Mitchell Dep., R. 879:4-23, 881:7-25, 882:3-9.) Mitchell also had a 
copy of Prime's list of potential clients. (Urry Dep., R. 856:8-17.) 
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by his employer, and he signed an agreement stating that he would use that list only for 
the employer's business. The agreement further provided that if he used the list "for 
any other purpose to the detriment or damage of the Company," he would be liable for 
five thousand dollars in liquidated damages. IdL at 624 n.l. The agreement also 
included a provision preventing the employee from selling hearing aids in the areas ser-
viced by the employer in Utah within one year of terminating his employment, subject 
to liquidated damages of three thousand dollars. Id. n.2. 
The employee subsequently opened his own business selling hearing aids, and he 
sold hearing aids to persons who had been identified as potential customers by his 
employer. The trial court held that the employee was liable for the $5000 liquidated 
damages for using the customer leads and $3000 for violating the noncompetition 
provision. The supreme court reversed the award of damages for violating the 
covenant not to compete, finding that the covenant was unenforceable because the 
salesman was engaged in a "common calling." IdL at 627-28. However, the court 
affirmed the award of damages for the employee's use of the customer leads, finding 
that the liquidated damage amount did not constitute an improper penalty. Id. at 625-
27. The court specifically recognized that, to some extent, the customer leads "were in 
the nature of trade secrets due to the time, expense, and effort which went into 
discovering the leads." Id. at 628. 
In a recent case remarkably similar to our own, the Alaska Supreme Court has 
held that a contractual provision prohibiting an agent from contacting a broker's clients 
is enforceable even if the provision is not expressly limited in time or in area. Metcalfe 
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Investments. Inc. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996).3 In Metcalfe, the court 
upheld a real estate agent's oral agreement to refrain from doing business with potential 
buyers whom she first met through her employment. The president of the brokerage 
testified that he and the agent had orally agreed that the agent would refrain from 
contacting the brokerage's customers after her departure. This oral agreement did not 
have a geographical or time limitation, though the broker later testified that he 
"assumed" the limitation would last for one year. The agent eventually left the broker-
age and opened up her own business, where she sold real estate to at least five of the 
brokerage's clients. The trial court granted summary judgment for the former agent, 
holding that the agreement was too vague to be enforceable. 
The Alaska Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Most significantly, the court 
expressly held that the agreement was not rendered unenforceable by the lack of a 
geographical or time limitation, because the agreement did not restrict competition. 
Instead, the court explained that the agreement merely prevented the agent from 
exploiting the brokerage's information and customers: 
[T]his agreement is enforceable without such [geographical and time] 
limits. This is not the type of noncompetition agreement that courts 
typically see, limiting a former employee's ability to engage in a trade or 
profession within a given area for some period of time. Instead, it is an 
agreement that left Garrison free to set up a carbon copy of Metcalfe 
Investments right down the street if she wished. The only thing she was 
prohibited from doing was expropriating information and customers that 
Metcalfe Investments had procured at its own expense. Thus the lack of 
geographical limitation is irrelevant because the covenant was not a 
blanket prohibition on competition, but rather a selective restraint on 
3
 A copy of this opinion is included at Addendum Exhibit 7. 
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doing business with people who were potential Metcalfe Investments 
customers at the time of her termination. 
Id. at 1361 (emphasis added). The court also held that the oral agreement was 
sufficiently definite to be enforceable, and that it did not injure the public interest. 
B. Paragraph eighteen is simply a limitation on the use of Prime's proprietary 
information, not a covenant not to compete, so explicit geographical and 
durational limitations are not required. 
Paragraph eighteen's plain language demonstrates that it is not an unenforceable 
covenant not to compete. There is nothing in paragraph eighteen preventing Mitchell 
from working for another real estate broker or otherwise engaging in the real estate 
industry, either in Utah or elsewhere. Instead, paragraph eighteen prevents Mitchell 
from using specific "information and materials" obtained from Prime. Just as in 
Metcalfe. Mitchell was perfectly free to set up a carbon copy of Prime right down the 
street; he was simply required to do so without using Prime's own materials. 
As with the first issue discussed in this brief, this issue involves competing 
contractual interpretations. Therefore, as the nonmoving party, Prime need only show 
that paragraph eighteen can reasonably be interpreted as being enforceable. Once 
again, Prime is not required to prove that the trial court's reading was unreasonable; 
instead, Prime merely needs to show that Prime's own reading of paragraph eighteen, 
i.e., as a prohibition on using customer lists, is tenable. R & R Energies. 936 P.2d at 
1074. If Prime's reading is tenable, then the provision is ambiguous, and summary 
judgment is inappropriate. Id. 
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Of course, it may be possible to read paragraph eighteen as a blanket prohibition 
on competition. That is, a court could determine that "information" gained from the 
"business" of employer includes general knowledge about the real estate business, and 
that therefore a prohibition on use of that information would prevent Mitchell from 
engaging in the real estate business altogether. Ct Robbins. 645 P.2d at 628 ("General 
knowledge or expertise acquired through employment in a common calling cannot be 
appropriated as a trade secret"). The trial court apparently interpreted paragraph 
eighteen in exactly this fashion. However, Prime submits that this construction is not 
reasonable. Indeed, such a construction would lead to strange results. For example, 
suppose that Prime has two agents, one who comes to the brokerage with extensive real 
estate experience, and one who comes to the brokerage with no experience whatsoever. 
As applied to the experienced agent, paragraph eighteen would not be a "covenant not 
to compete," because the agent's general knowledge about the real estate business 
would not have been gained from Prime. Therefore, paragraph eighteen would be 
enforceable as to that agent. As applied to the inexperienced agent, however, para-
graph eighteen would be a covenant not to compete and would therefore be unenforce-
able. In other words, the language is exactly the same in both scenarios, and the 
persons in both scenarios are doing exactly the same job in exactly the same industry, 
but the scenarios lead to completely opposite results.4 
4
 This result is made even more questionable when one considers that paragraph 
eighteen is supposedly unambiguous, so that the question of enforceability must be 
decided as a matter of law, without consideration of extrinsic evidence. 
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At any rate, even if the trial court's interpretation of paragraph eighteen is 
reasonable, it is not the only reasonable interpretation. Prime's interpretation of para-
graph eighteen, that it does not prevent all competition, is certainly reasonable as well. 
That is, one can reasonably conclude that the use of the terms "materials" and "files" in 
paragraph eighteen implies an intent to prohibit only the use of specific information 
developed by or for Prime, not the use of the general knowledge and expertise Mitchell 
gained through his employment. 
Utah courts have long held that a contract provision will be construed, wherever 
possible, in such a manner as to render that provision enforceable. A "cardinal rule" in 
contract interpretation is to give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in 
their agreements. Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852, 857-58 (Utah 
1998). Courts should be reluctant to nullify those agreements, except in the clearest 
situations. Thus, in Coulter & Smith, the Utah Supreme Court saved an option contract 
from invalidation by the rule against perpetuities by implying a "reasonable time" 
limitation on the exercise of the option. The court noted that "[t]he choice of contract 
interpretations which avoid invalidating an agreement is favored under Utah law." IcL 
at 858. See also Stangl v. Todd. 554 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (Utah 1976) ("This court has 
long adhered to the principle that in construing a contract, a construction giving an 
instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted where reasonable, 
and between two possible constructions that will be adopted which establishes a valid 
contract."). 
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The trial court's grant of summary judgment depended entirely on its conclusion 
that paragraph eighteen constituted a covenant not to compete. However, it is at least 
reasonable to construe paragraph eighteen simply as an enforceable restriction on an 
agent's ability to use Prime's proprietary information. Therefore, there is at least a 
triable issue of fact as to the actual intended meaning of paragraph eighteen, and 
summary judgment was not appropriate. 
C. Even if time and geographical limitations were required, reasonable 
restrictions should be read into paragraph eighteen to give effect to the 
agreement of the parties. 
As the Alaska Supreme Court explained in Metcalfe, because paragraph eighteen 
of Mitchell's agreement with Prime is not a covenant not to compete, but rather a 
restriction on use of specific trade information, it is effective and enforceable even 
without a geographical or time limitation. 919 P.2d at 1361-62. Therefore, the trial 
court erred in holding paragraph eighteen unenforceable. However, even if paragraph 
eighteen could only reasonably be considered as a covenant not to compete, requiring 
time and geographical limitations, such limitations should be implied into paragraph 
eighteen. 
Courts in most jurisdictions have held that unless a covenant not to compete was 
drafted in bad faith, an overbroad covenant should be reasonably altered to render it 
enforceable. Data Management. Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988). The 
Restatement of Contracts also recommends this approach. Restatement (2d) of 
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Contracts § 184(2) (1981); see also id^ cmt. b. This approach appears to be required 
by Coulter & Smith as well. 966 P.2d at 857-58.5 
Geographical restrictions can easily be read into paragraph eighteen. Indeed, 
such limitations are essentially self-executing, as the restriction on using Prime's 
materials clearly is relevant only in areas in which Prime does business. See, e.g.. 
System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983) ("In light of the 
industry's inherent limitations and the nature of the defendant's particular employment, 
it was not unreasonable for SCI to omit from the covenant a specific and explicit spacial 
restriction. The covenant is impliedly limited to the area in which SCI had been and is 
seeking its market.") 
Similarly, a reasonable time restriction can be read into paragraph eighteen. Just 
as the court in Coulter & Smith added an implied time limitation to save the contract in 
that case from unenforceability, 966 P.2d at 858, so too should the courts in this case, 
if such a restriction is deemed necessary. As Coulter & Smith explained, when a con-
5
 See also JAK Productions. Inc. v. Wiza. 986 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(applying Indiana law); Moore Bus. Forms. Inc. v. Wilson. 953 F. Supp. 1056 (N.D. 
Iowa 1996) (applying Iowa law); LaCalhene. Inc. v. Spolver. 938 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. 
Wis. 1996) (applying Minnesota law); National Interstate Ins. Co. v. Perro. 934 
F. Supp. 883 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (applying Ohio law); Nestle Food Co. v. Miller. 836 
F. Supp. 69 (D.R.I. 1993) (applying Rhode Island law); Herring Gas Co.. Inc. v. 
Magee. 813 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (applying Mississippi law); Kramer v. 
Robec. Inc.. 824 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (applying Pennsylvania law); Ferro-
fluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components. Inc.. 789 F. Supp. 1201 (D.N.H. 
1992) (applying New Hampshire law); Bunker Romano Corp. v. Altech. Inc.. 765 
F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. 111. 1990) (applying Washington law); Data Management. Inc. v. 
Greene. 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988); Phoenix Orthopedic Surgeons. Ltd. v. Peairs. 790 
P.2d 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); National Graphics Co. v. Dillev. 681 P.2d 546 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1984). 
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tract is silent on the time within which an act is to be performed, courts will infer that 
the act was required to be done within a reasonable time. Id In addition, where a 
contract is silent as to a certain point, courts can also consider relevant industry 
standards. Rg,, Craig Food Indus, v. Weihing. 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) ("Trade usage or custom is permissible to explain technical terms in contracts to 
which particular meanings attach; to make certain that which is indefinite, ambiguous, 
or obscure; to supply necessary matters on which the contract itself is silent\ and 
generally to elucidate the intention of the parties when the meaning of the contract 
cannot be clearly ascertained from the language.") Before the trial court, Prime 
submitted uncontroverted evidence establishing that the standard restriction in the real 
estate brokerage business is one year. (Urry Dep., R. 849:24 - 855:20, Add. Ex. 3; 
Martin Aff. 11 5-8, R. 877-78, Add. Ex. 6.) 
D. Mitchell clearly agreed not to use Prime's customer list and other 
proprietary information for his own purposes, and he should be held to that 
agreement. 
The record before the trial court reveals three undisputable facts. First, Mitchell 
expressly agreed not to use information and materials gained from Prime to his own 
advantage. Second, Prime provided Mitchell with lists of potential clients and cus-
tomers, which Prime itself had developed. Third, Mitchell did use information and 
materials gained from Prime to his own advantage. It is clearly permissible for a 
broker to obtain relief in such a situation. The fact that Prime might have been pre-
cluded from obtaining relief in a different factual situation should not render paragraph 
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eighteen unenforceable as applied to the case at bar. C£. Perry v. Moran. 748 P.2d 
224, 230-31 (Wash. 1987), modified on other grounds 766 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1989) 
(noting that five-year term in noncontact provision may have been unreasonably long, 
but issue was moot because employer was seeking to enforce provision only for 
eighteen-month period after termination). 
Prime is not looking to prevent Mitchell from earning a living. Prime is not 
even trying to keep Mitchell from competing in the real estate industry. Instead, Prime 
is simply being asked to be compensated for the damages Prime has sustained as a 
result of Mitchell's misuse of customer information that Prime itself developed at 
Prime's own time and expense. Mitchell expressly agreed to paragraph eighteen, and it 
is only fair to ask Mitchell to live up to his agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Prime Commercial, Inc., therefore respectfully requests 
that this Court vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Prime's 
counterclaims against Mitchell and remand the action to the trial court for further 
proceedings. Prime further requests that this Court award Prime its costs incurred in 
bringing this appeal pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a 
Corporation, and SALT LAKE 
BOARD OF REALTORS, a 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950906465 CV 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
On the 8th day of May, 1998, Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
came on for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba. The Plaintiff appeared by 
and through his attorney, Dennis K. Poole, and the Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc. 
appeared by and through its attorney, Nathan Wilcox. The Court having considered 
the affidavits and memoranda in support of and in opposition to such Motion for Partial 
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Summary Judgment and having determined that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact which are set forth as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Brent D. Mitchell ("Mitchell"), an individual, and the Defendant 
Prime Commercial, Inc. ("Prime Commercial"), a corporation, entered into an 
agreement dated January 1, 1994, designated by the parties as a broker-agent 
agreement (the "Agreement"), whereby Mitchell agreed to act as an independent 
licensed real estate agent for Prime Commercial, as broker. 
2. Paragraph 7 of the Agreement states: 
The division and distribution of the earned commissions pursuant to 
Paragraph 6 of this Agreement shall take place as soon as feasible after 
collection of such commissions from the party or parties for whom the 
services may have been performed. Any suit for the collection of 
commissions from clients shall be maintained only in the name of Broker. 
Agent shall not be entitled to any advance or payment from Broker upon 
future commissions or commissions earned but uncollected. Agent's only 
remuneration shall be Agent's share of the commissions paid by the party 
or parties for whom services were performed. Any advances paid to 
agents must be approved by Broker and must be documented by a note. 
3. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement states: 
In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of 
property, and all employment in connection with the real estate business 
shall be taken in the name of Broker. Listings shall be filed with Broker 
within twenty four (24) hours after receipt of any such listing by Agent. 
In consideration for the commission payable to Agent pursuant to the 
terms of this Agreement, Agent agrees to and does hereby contribute all 
right and title to any and all listings solicited and obtained by Agent to 
Broker for the benefit and use of Broker, Agent and all other agents 
associated with Broker to whom Broker may give the listing; provided, 
however, that Agent shall have the rights provided in Paragraph 12 of 
this Agreement with respect to listings procured by Agent prior to 
termination. 
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4. Paragraph 18 of the Agreement states: 
Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's 
own advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, 
any information or materials gained for or from the files or business of 
Broker. 
5. Paragraph 4 of the Agreement states: 
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and 
use Agent's best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed 
with broker, to solicit additional listings and customers for Broker and 
otherwise promote the business of serving the public in real estate 
transactions to the end that each of the parties to this Agreement may 
derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit 
particular listings or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do 
so. Agent agrees to perform no other activities in association with 
Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and sales, leases, representa-
tion agreements or management contract of property, for the parties' 
mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the ethical and 
professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 
6. After January 1, 1994, Mitchell became a member and manager of Red 
Point Equity, LLC. ("Red Point"), a limited liability company engaged in the business 
of real estate development. 
7. Mitchell became a member of Red Point which was organized to pursue 
real estate development activities. The other member and manager of Red Point was 
Mitchell's spouse. 
8. In 1994, Red Point entered into a joint venture agreement with Leonard 
K.M. Fong ("Fong") for the development of a planned unit development on property 
located on Atwood Boulevard in Murray, Utah. 
F:\WORO\EKH\ORO\MITCHEL2.WPO Page 3 
9. In furtherance of the joint venture agreement and with the assistance of 
East 5600 South; (ii) 2.5 acres at Alta; (iii) Alta Pines - 4070 South 900 East; (iv) 
Landing Point - 176 North Redwood Rd; and (v) 2.2 acres - W. Jordan. 
19. Of the above five designated properties, only three of them were under 
a current listing with Prime Commercial at the time Mitchell left. The 6-Plex property 
consideration paid to Red Point (even if construed to be for the benefit of Mitchell) for 
profits or an interest in a development joint venture with Fong. 
|5. Because the Agreement, specifically Paragraph 18, contains no facial 
ambiguity, and because the use of any information or materials gained by Mitchell from 
Prime Commercial would prohibit any competition by Mitchell, such restriction is 
unenforceable as a matter of law. 
p. Because Paragraph 18 is not ambiguous and because the contract is an 
integrated contract, the Defendant is not entitled to rely upon parol evidence, including 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing ORDER 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT in Case No. 950906465 CV was mailed, postage prepaid, 
United States Mail, the rffi day of May, 1998, to the following: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Douglas E. Grant, Esq. 
Randall E. Grant, Esq. 
GRANT & GRANT 
349 South 200 East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, ytah-84111 
l%m<*> / V<n^v 
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THIS AGREEMENT, made this 1st day of January, 1994 by and between PRIME COMMERCIAL, 
INC. ("Broker"), and Brent D. Mitchell ("Agent") an individual authorized to act as a licensed 
real estate agent in the State of Utah. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Broker is qualified to and does engage in business as a licensed general real 
estate broker in the State of Utah; and 
WHEREAS, Group maintains an office in the State of Utah, properly equipped with 
furnishings and other equipment necessary and incidental to the proper operation of said 
business, and staffed suitably to serve the public as a real estate broker; and 
WHEREAS, Agent is now engaged in business as a licensed real estate agent; and 
WHERE'XS, the parties consider it to be to their mutual advantage to form the association 
hereinafter agreed to. 
NOW, THEREFORE in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein 
contained, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Broker agrees to make available to Agent, at Agent's request, all current listings in 
the Broker's office. In addition, at Agent's discretion and at Agent's request, Broker 
may, from time to time, supply Agent with prospective listings. Nothing herein stated 
shall be construed to require Agent to accept or service any particular listing or 
prospective listing offered by Broker; nor shall Broker have any right or authority 
to direct that Agent see or service particular parties, or to restrict Agent's activities 
to particular areas. Broker shall have no right, except to the extent required by law, 
to direct or limit Agent's activities as to hours, leads, open houses, opportunity or 
floor time, prospects, sales, sales meetings, schedule, services, inventory, time off, 
training, vacations, or similar activities. 
2- At Agent's request and in Agent's sole discretion, Broker agrees to furnish such 
advice, information and full cooperation as Agent shall decide. Broker agrees that by 
furnishing any such advice, information or cooperation, Broker obtains no authority 
or right to direct or control Agent's actions except as specifically required by law and 
that Agent assumes and retains discretion for methods, techniques and procedures 
used in soliciting and obtaining listings and sales, leases, or representation 
agreements. # 
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EXHIBIT 
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Broker agrees that Agent may share with other agents all the facilities of the office 
now operated by Broker in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, 
which office is now maintained at 4505 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 120, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84124. 
Until termination of this Agreement, Agent agrees to work diligently and use Agent's 
best efforts to sell, lease or rent any and all real estate listed with Broker, to solicit 
additional listings and customers for Broker and otherwise promote the business of 
serving the public in real estate transactions to the end that each of the parties to 
this Agreement may derive the greatest profit possible, provided that nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to require Agent to handle or solicit particular listings 
or authorize Broker to direct or require that Agent do so. Agent agrees to perform no 
other activities in association with Broker, except to solicit and obtain listings and 
sales, leases, representation agreements or management contract of property, for the 
parties' mutual benefit, and to do so in accordance with law and the ethical and 
professional standards as required in Paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 
Agent agrees to commit no act of a type for which the Securities Commission or the 
Board of Real Estate Examiners of the State of Utah is authorized to suspend or revoke 
the license of either Agent or Broker. Broker and Agent agree to conform to and 
abide by all laws, rules and regulations, and codes of ethics that are binding upon or 
applicable to real estate brokers or agents. 
Broker's typical and customary commissions from time to time in effect, shall be 
charged to the parties for whom services are performed, except that Broker may 
agree in writing to other rates with such parties. Broker will advise all agents 
associated with Broker of any special commission rates made with respect to the 
listings as provided in this paragraph. When Agent shall perform any services under 
this Agreement for which a commission is earned, the commission shall, when 
collected, be divided between Broker and Agent as set forth in the Commission 
Schedule attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference, unless 
Broker and Agent agree in writing upon a different method of dividing the 
commission before completion of any particular transaction. In the event that two or 
more agents participate in any service which is subject to this Agreement, or claim 
to have done so, the amount of the commission over that accruing to Broker shall be 
divided between the participating agents according to agreement between them or 
by arbitration. In no case shall Broker be personally liable to Agent for Agent's 
share of any commission not collected, nor shall Agent be personally liable to Broker 
for any commissions not collected. In compliance with the laws of the State of Utah, 
all commissions will be received by Broken When any commission shall have been 
collected from the party or parties for whom the service was performed, Broker shall 
hold the same in trust for Agent and Broker to be divided between them according to 
the terms of this Agreement. Agents shall not have the right to negotiate 
commissions with current or prospective clients without first discussing same with 
Broker and obtaining permission from Broker. 
The division and distribution of the earned commissions pursuant to Paragraph 6 of 
this Agreement shall take place as soon as feasible after collection of such 
commissions from the party or parties for whom the services may have been 
performed. Any suit for the collection of commissions from clients shall be 
maintained only in the name of Broker. Agent shall not be entitled to any advance or 
payment from Broker upon future commissions or commissions earned but 
uncollected. Agent's only remuneration shall be Agent's share of the commissions 
paid by the party or parties for whom services were performed. Any advances paid to 
agents must be approved by Broker and must be documented by a note. 
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8. Broker shall not be liable to Agent for any expenses incurred by Agent, or for any of 
Agent's acts except as specifically required by law, nor shall Agent be liable to 
Broker for office help or expense. Agent shall have no authority to bind Broker by 
any promise or representation unless specifically authorized in writing in a 
particular transaction. Expenses that must, by reason of some necessity, be paid from 
the commission, or are incurred in the collection of, or the attempt to collect, the 
commission, shall be paid by the parties in the same proportion as the commission, 
divided pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
9. Agent agrees to provide and pay for ail Agent's necessary professional licenses and 
dues; Broker shall not be liable to reimburse Agent therefor. In the event that Broker 
elects to advance sums to Agent for the payment of Agent's professional licenses, 
dues or other items, Agent agrees to repay such advances to Broker upon demand and 
Broker may deduct such advances from commissions otherwise payable to Agent. 
10. This Agreement does not constitute a hiring by either party. It is the parties' 
intention that, so far as shall be in conformity with law, Agent shall be an 
independent contractor and not Broker's employee, and in conformity therewith, 
that Agent retain sole and absolute discretion and judgment in the manner and 
means of carrying out Agent's selling and soliciting activities. Therefore, the parties 
hereto are and shall remain independent contractors bound by the provisions of this 
Agreement. Agent is under the control of Broker as to the result of Agent's work only 
and not as to the means by which such is accomplished. This Agreement shall not be 
construed as a partnership and Broker shall not be liable for any obligation incurred 
by Agent. 
11. In accordance with law, Agent agrees that any and all listings of property, and all 
employment in connection with the real estate business shall be taken in the name 
of Broker. Listings shall be filed with Broker within twenty four (24) hours after 
receipt of any such listing by Agent. In consideration for the commission payable to 
Agent pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, Agent agrees to and does hereby 
contribute all right and title to any and all listings solicited and obtained by Agent to 
Broker for the benefit and use of Broker, Agent and all other agents associated with 
Broker to whom Broker may give the listing; provided, however, that Agent shall 
have the rights provided in Paragraph 12 of this Agreement with respect to listings 
procured by Agent prior to termination. 
On completion of any work-in-process, this Agreement may be terminated, with or 
without cause, by Broker or Agent at any time. Broker may terminate this 
Agreement on the occurrence of any of the following causes: 
(a) An election of Broker to sell its entire business or to cease doing business; 
(b) Any breach of this Agreement by Agent; 
(c) Suspension, revocation, or other termination of Agent's license; 
(d) Failure of Agent to comply with any applicable law or regulation of 
either the Securities Commission or the Board of Real Estate Examiners; 
(e) Conviction of Agent of any crime other than minor traffic offenses. 
p o n
 ,
te rniination of this Agreement, Agent's regular proportionate share of the 
of m m ! s s i o n s o n a n y sales Agent has made that are not closed shall, upon the closing 
such sales, be paid to Agent, if collected by Broker. Except in cases of termination 
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for cause, Agent shall also be entitled to receive the portion of the commissions, 
received by Broker after termination, allocable to the listing (but not the sale) as set 
forth in Broker's current commissions schedules, on any listings procured by Agent 
during Agent's association with Broker. 
If, upon termination of this Agreement, Agent fails to complete work on any pending 
transactions that normally would be rendered by Agent, Broker shall make 
arrangements with another agent in Broker's organization to perform such work 
and shall be compensated for completing the details of pending transactions and 
such compensation shall be deducted from Agent's share of the commission. 
In the event of disagreement or dispute between Agent and any other agent 
associated with Broker, or between Broker and Agent arising out of or connected 
with this Agreement which cannot be adjusted by and between the parties involved, 
the dispute or disagreement shall be submitted to the Real Estate Board of which 
Broker is a member for arbitration pursuant to the provisions of its bylaws, said 
provisions being hereby incorporated by reference, and if the bylaws of such board 
include no provision for arbitration, then arbitration shall be pursuant to the rules 
of the American Arbitration Association which rules are by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
Agent agrees to indemnify Broker and hold Broker harmless from, as well as defend 
Broker against, all claims, demands and liabilities, including costs and attorney's fees, 
to which Broker is subjected by reason of any action taken by Agent or failed to be 
taken by Agent pursuant to this Agreement. 
It is contemplated by both parties to this Agreement that Agent will use a motor 
vehicle for the purpose of transporting clients or other persons as part of Agent's 
efforts to solicit and obtain listings and sales, rentals or leases of property, Agent 
agrees as part of Agent's commitment to serving the public as a licensed real estate 
agent to maintain motor vehicle liability insurance with the following minimum 
coverage's: S100,000/S300,000/S5,000 bodily injury/property damage (or a combined 
single limit of S300,000). Broker shall be named as an additional insured under 
Agent's insurance coverages. Agent shall provide proof that such coverages are in 
force at the time of execution of this Agreement and shall provide such proof at any 
subsequent time at Broker's request. 
Agent shall not, after the termination of this Agreement, use to Agent's own 
advantage, or to the advantage of any other person or corporation, any information 
or materials gained for or from the files or business of Broker. 
The following provisions are also integral parts of this Agreement: 
(a) This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
successors, assigns, personal representatives, heirs and legatees of the 
respective parties hereto, and any entities resulting from the 
reorganization, consolidation or merger of any party hereto. 
(b) This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding and agreement 
between the parties and supersedes all prior agreements, representations 
or understandings between the parties relating to the subject matter 
hereof. All prior agreements relating to the subject matter hereof, 
whether written or oral, are hereby merged into this Agreement. 
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This Agreement may not be modified except by an instrument in writing 
signed by the parties hereto. 
This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and enforced according to 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
In the event any action or proceeding is brought by either party against 
the other under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
recover attorneys1 fees in such amount as the court may adjudge 
reasonable. 
Agent stipulates that Agent has had the opportunity to review with Broker the 
policies and procedures of Broker and understands the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on the date first set 
forth above. 
BROKER: 
PRIME COMM 
AGENT 
-£^ 
ACKNOWT FDGHfNT HP RECEIPT 
«f rhe foregoing Agreement together with Exhibit A 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing g 
theret0
- J ^7 J^S 
^ / / <//?</ Agent 
Date 
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COMMISSION SCHEDULE 
renditions Governing Payment of Commissions to Agent: 
1. Broker will only pay commissions on cash income. 
2. If Broker's share of a commission or any part thereof is deferred or if a note is taken, 
Broker will not be required to pay any commission to Agent until cash income is 
received. 
3. If a note is taken by Broker for commissions owed and interest is earned on that note, 
then Agent shall receive a share of the interest proceeds in the same proportions as 
the commission splits set forth in Exhibit A. 
4 The commission schedule shall be based on Exhibit A as attached hereto. Said 
schedule shall remain in effect, unless agreed upon by both parties in writing. 
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COMMISSION a r u i *> 
PARTNER ASSOCIATE 
$55 000.00 $27,500.00 $27,500.00 
5 0
-
S 0
 « R n n o 0 0 $90 000 00 $21,000.00 $14,000.00 
60-40 $55,000.00 » " J ' ™
 $ 1 1 2 .000.00 $48,000.00 
70.30 WO- 0 0 0 - 0 0 $ 2 S 0 ' 0 0 0 - 0 0 J;flo;5oo.OO $89,500.00 64.20% 
TOTAL 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
VS. 
PLAINTIFF, 
PRIME COMMERCIAL INC., A 
CORPORATION, AND SALT LAKE BOARD 
OF REALTORS, A CORPORATION. 
DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NO. 950906465 CV 
DEPOSITION OF STEVE ORRY 
TAKEN! MAY 22. 1996 
File No. 52296 
Reported oy: __ 
KELLY SOMMERVILLB, CSR, RPR 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS 
5980 South Fashion Blvd. 
Murray, Utah 84107 
263-1396 
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A. Some less independent than others. 
Q. In your understanding of that term, 
independent contractor, what makes them independent 
contractors? 
A. It's a definition of a real estate 
agent. They're, well, again, you're asking a very 
difficult question because based on my answer it can 
go either direction you want to take it. What 
should be an independent agent is that that agent 
comes to the office and you supply them with a desk 
and a phone and as necessary means to conduct their 
business activity. And one thing with our agents at 
Prime Commercial, they are all much less independent 
than others simply because we provide more. That 
means if someone needs a draw on funds, someone 
needs help financially, Prime Commercial has always 
been there to be there for them. So by definition, 
we probably don't have an independent agent in our 
company because every one of them have become 
dependent upon Prime Commercial from time to time 
for help, which is unique in dealing with a real 
estate brokerage company like Prime Commercial or 
others that I've ever been involved in. 
So the term independent agent should be 
that they're there, they pay for their own phones, 
24 
K e l l y S o m m e r v i l l e , R .P .R. 
A A f t C ^ 
1 I between Prime Commercial and Mr. Mitchell that you 
2 currently are aware of, written agreements? 
3 A. Not that I'm aware of, no. That doesn't 
4 mean there aren't any, but that doesn't mean -- we 
5 have plenty of things to do. It's hard to keep 
6 these things straight five, six years down the road. 
7 Q . I presume that prior to the time that 
8 this was entered into, Mr. Mitchell was a licensed 
9 real estate agent in the state of Utah; is that 
10 I correct? 
11 A. I'd make that same assumption. 
12 Q. You wouldn't have hired him or entered 
13 into this agreement if that would have been false; 
14 is that correct? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. What training did Prime Commercial 
17 provide to Mr. Mitchell upon his being retained as 
18 an agent for Prime? 
19 A. I personally worked with Brent basically 
20 from the day he started until the day he left or was 
21 asked to leave is a better way to put it. Brent had 
22 no previous experience in real estate and so I 
23 provided him with lists of potential candidates, 
24 potential sellers of income property, both himself 
25 and Greg Pavich actually are the two guys that were 
32 
Kelly Somme-rville, R.P.R. 
0008 
there at the time. I provided him lists that I had 
created over several years of apartment property 
owners that he could use for cold calling. I taught 
him how to write an earnest money offer. I taught 
him how to write a contract. I basically explained 
to him all the pro forma procedures, explained to 
him the investment analysis of income property, 
specifically apartments was where he chose to spend 
his time. I helped him in the process of him 
talking to clients about developing projects that I 
went through and developed, and showed him how to do 
the development pro formas and actually did 
development pro formas for him and his accounts. 
Basically I have to say, everything 
Brent Mitchell learned about real estate he learned 
at Prime and the people he was associated with at 
Prime. Prior to that date, he was installing 
sprinkler pipe. 
Q. Under the terms of your agreement with 
Mr. Mitchell under Exhibit Number 1, the broker 
agreed to assist the agent at its direction, did it 
not? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Is it also true that as the agent 
succeeds so does the brokerage company? 
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1 Q. Why don't you identify that specific 
2 conversation for me? 
3 A. The conversation would relate 
4 J specifically to the Red Points Fong scenario and I 
5 had worked with Brent and two or three other, and I 
6 can't remember the names quite frankly, past 
7 projects where he wanted me to come in and help him 
8 with a development pro forma for the potential of 
9 building condominiums and duplexes and things of 
10 that nature. 
11 Q. We'll come back to that point here. 
12 Under the terms of Exhibit Number 1, what did you 
13 understand Mr. Mitchell was to perform in terms of 
14 services for Prime? 
15 A. Well, if you go to paragraph 11, I think 
16 it pretty well clearly defines it. It says, "In 
17 accordance with the law, agents agree any and all 
18 listings of the property and all employment, all 
19 employment in connection with the real estate 
20 business shall be taken in the name of the broker." 
21 That means basically anything you do in the real 
22 estate business belongs to the broker and is subject 
23 to the broker's fee schedule. 
24 Q. so define to me what other types of 
25 I employment would, be included within that phrase 
I 3 
Kelly Sommerville, R.P.R. 
0008 
1 according to your understanding? 
2 A. All employment. 
3 Q. That includes development activities? 
4 A. Absolutely. 
5 Q. Would that include his acquisition of a 
6 J piece of property? 
7 A. If he were using Prime Commercial and 
8 using commissions to buy the property, absolutely. 
9 Q. Even if it were his own commissions? 
10 A. If he were to take a commission, I'll 
LI give you an example of that. One of the agents came 
L2 to me and said, "I don't have the money to buy this 
L3 property. I want to be able to put all the 
.4 commissions, even Prime's share of the commission 
.5 into buying this property." And I said, "That's 
.6 fine. You can buy it and you own 70 percent of it. 
7 Your split is 70 percent. Prime owns 30 percent." 
8 I Q. What if the agent wanted to put in his 
9 I 30 percent? 
0 A. If he wanted to put in his 30 percent, 
1 that's fine. He can buy it on his own. He has to 
2 notify the brokerage company he's buying it because 
3 it's part of the requirement of the contract to 
4 I notify any seller that a buyer is a licensed agent 
5 and the broker should be notified if he is buying 
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1 real estate. 
2 Q. If an agent wanted to go out and build a 
3 piece of property and he didn't use any of Prime's 
4 funds, commissions, would that still be included 
5 within the language of paragraph 11? 
6 A. If he is not taking services. If he is 
7 providing services for equity, the answer is that 
8 Prime would own a portion of those services. 
9 Q. So the distinguishing characteristic is 
10 whether or not he is providing services? 
11 A. If he's providing services and not being 
12 compensated for those services and he is receiving 
13 equity in lieu of those services, then the services 
14 that he is performing is on behalf of Prime 
15 Commercial and Prime Commercial will be compensated 
16 for them. And that's true with every agent we have 
17 in our company and with every other agent I've been 
18 associated with and every other brokerage company 
19 I've been associated with. There are a lot of 
20 agents that in the past in this business have tried 
21 to provide those services without commission or 
22 reduction in commission and then therefore getting 
23 an interest in the property and the brokerage 
24 community has not stood for that and that is 
25 I something that has happened here and we aren't 
38 
Kelly Sommerville, R.P.R. 
1 standing for it either. 
2 Q. Look at paragraph 4. As I read that 
3 particular paragraph, the agent's responsibilities 
4 are to sell, lease, rent, solicit listings and 
5 customers. Is that a fair summary of that 
6 paragraph? 
7 I A. Sure. Of £hat paragraph, you're 
8 correct. 
9 Q. And as I also read that paragraph, it 
10 says that the agent agrees to perform no other 
11 activities in association with the broker; is that 
12 correct? 
13 A. That's correct. 
14 Q. Does that mean that Mr. Mitchell or, 
15 well, let's leave it to any agent, an agent is 
16 precluded from doing developing activities from the 
17 broker? 
13 A. Understand that development activity is 
L9 active in the process of trying to sell the property 
JO or lease the property. If you're developing a 
51
 property, you're in the act of trying to sell or 
•2 lease that property, it's just a part of that 
3 J activity. If I go develop a shopping center, I'm in 
4 a situation where I'm building that project, in the 
5 process of leasing it, and selling it. It's a part 
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1 of that transaction. It's a part of that activity. 
2 I'm in the process of selling it. I'm to sell. 
3 Q. But they are separate and distinct 
4 J activities, are they not? 
5 MR. KARRENBERG: I'll object. It 
6 misstates the witness's testimony. It's part of the 
7 J sale. It was not separate. He said it was included 
8 in it . 
9 J Q. (By Mr. Poole) Is the selling separate 
10 J and distinct from the development though? 
11 A. No, it's part of the process. 
12 Q. Every developer intends at some point to 
13 sell, does he not? 
14 A. Or lease. That's what you're doing it 
15 for. 
16 Q. Okay. And if I were developing a piece 
17 of property and I hired you to sell, our activities 
18 would be separate and distinct, would they not? 
19 That's a yes or no. 
20 MR. KARRENBERG: If you can answer yes 
21 or no. 
22 THE WITNESS: I don't understand the 
23 question. I don't understand the question. I can't 
24 respond to it. 
25 Q. (By Mr. Poole) If I decide to develop 
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Q. And Prime would be entitled to that if 
the services provided were development services as 
opposed to the listing, the selling, or the leasing 
of the property? 
MR. KARRENBERG: I'll object as to 
foundation. It misstates the witness's testimony. 
He already told you several times, Dennis, that 
development services are part of the sales leasing 
and you're still trying to distinguish it. And 
that's not the witness's testimony. You can answer 
the question. 
THE WITNESS: The answer to the 
question, as my counsel just stated, I'm telling you 
that is part of section 11, paragraph 11. All 
employment in connection with real estate business, 
and if you want to go to that paragraph, that 
clearly is the answer to the question. If you want 
to go to paragraph 4, I've already clearly stated t 
you that the sale, lease or rent, if there's 
development activity is part of the sale or lease o 
that property. It's part of that transaction, part 
of that obligation, and part of the responsibility 
of the agent to provide that income to Prime 
Commercial. I can give you a very good example of 
that, if you'd like to hear one. 
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Q. (By Mr. Poole) Well, I'm sure we're 
going to hear one- Have other agents left Prime in 
the last two years, let's say '93, '94? 
A. I believe, let's see, there's one agent 
that was there for a very short time that came and 
left. 
Q. Have you had any other lawsuits 
involving agents in the last five years? 
A. Never had a lawsuit with regard to an 
agent. 
Q. Have you arbitrated any disputes between 
agents and Prime in the last five years? 
A. Never had an argument with an agent. 
Q. Now, Mr. Mitchell departed from Prime in 
1994. Do you recall the approximate date that that 
occurred? 
A. You'd have to remind me, I don't. 
Q. Mr. Mitchell says about August 31 of 
1994, would you disagree with that date? 
A. In that time frame. 
Q. What was your understanding of the 
reasons that he departed? 
A. Number one, he didn't depart. He was 
terminated and asked to leave the building'. He was 
escorted from the building. 
4! 
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1 to the Fong deal? 
2 1 A. Absolutely. 
3 Q. What was that payment to be? 
4 A. Well, it would have been 50 percent of 
5 anything he received. He agreed to that that day 
6 just like he had agreed to it previously. 
7 Q. And when did he agree to it previously? 
8 A. Oh, probably four to six months prior to 
9 that, just prior to his marriage. His wife first 
10 J became aware of this Red Points Equities. I saw it 
11 J on his desk. One of the secretaries had mentioned 
12 to me that he had been having Prime do an awful lot 
13 of work with something regarding Red Point Equities 
14 on Prime letterhead and she was a little concerned 
15 about it and was asking if that was appropriate. 
16 So, when I approached Brent on it, we 
17 discussed it for an hour or so and he agreed to that 
18 for a lot of reasons, we'd discussed how much money 
19 Prime Commercial had committed to him over the years 
20 I and the kinds of commitment we had and obviously 
21 it's the right thing to do and he agreed to it. 
22 Q. Was the agreement to split commissions 
23 or profits or both? 
24 A. Both, absolutely both, and it wasn't 
25 until the day he was terminated that he told me he 
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had determined he was not going to do that. 
Q. Now, when you became aware of this Red 
Points, you said this was prior to his marriage? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And do you know if Red Points was 
created prior to the marriage? 
A. I don't know. I couldn't tell you. All 
I know is I saw a document or a partnership 
agreement he was working on and I pointed it out to 
him and does he think that was right, and we 
discussed it for some time. Then he, at that point 
in time, he agreed that what he was doing was wrong 
and that Prime Commercial should be involved in it. 
And again, up until the day he was terminated, that 
was my understanding as well as the understanding of 
the balance of the agents. 
Q. If Prime was to be involved in it, why 
wasn't Prime a party to a development agreement with 
Mr. Fong? 
A. Very simply, Brent Mitchell had no 
intention at the time he created that agreement to 
have Prime Commercial be a part of that. And that's 
why we had our conversation. 
Q. And that's your conclusion. Did Mr. 
Mitchell, other than when he was terminated, tell 
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you that he was not going to have Prime involved? 
A. I'm sorry, I didn't understand the 
question. At what time are you talking about? 
Q. Other than the time when Mr. Mitchell 
was terminated and he said he wasn't going to pay 
anything to Prime, did he tell you at any other 
point in time that Prime was not going to be 
involved in the Fong transaction? 
A. From the first day I've talked to him, 
okay, when I saw the agreement on his desk, it was 
just prior to his marriage, and I discussed it with 
him. And he at that point in time had had no 
intention to have Prime involved. 
Q. He told you that? 
A. That's correct. It was in the 
agreement. We weren't in the agreement and I asked 
him why, and so we discussed it. And after our 
discussion was over, it ended very friendly, very 
amiably. He says, "You're right, I'm wrong. Prime 
Commercial should be involved and you will be 
involved." Until the day when I pointedly asked 
him, "What's going on with Fong? You're going to 
leave, aren't you?" I asked him, "You're going to 
leave before this Fong deal ever goes, aren't you?" 
And he said, "Yes, I am." And I said, "Why is that, 
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because you don't have any intention of paying Prime 
Commercial, do you?" He said, "No, I don't." I 
said, "Why?" He said, "You pressured me into that 
that day." I said, "What do you mean I pressured 
you? We had a conversation and you agreed it was 
the right thing to do, and you've changed your 
mind." And I said, "Why?" And he said, "Because my 
wife told me it wasn't right." 
The two times we came to the agreement, 
once was with Red Point Equities and the second was 
when I terminated him, the second day. And we came 
to a full agreement and both times in his 
conversation with his wife, his wife told him not to 
do something. So he went with her decision. He 
gave me an answer yes one day and no the next day. 
He did the same thing with Red Point Equities. 
Q. You said you saw an agreement and I kind 
of made an assumption of what it was. What was it 
you said? 
A. I said his partnership agreement he was 
negotiating with Red Point. 
Q. Did you understand Red Point to be a 
partnership? 
A. Red Point Equities, as far as I'm 
concerned, is an L.L.C., as far as I'm aware of 
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trying to find out. 
Q. Well, tell me today what information 
you're aware of that was used? 
A. Anything he took with him that in terms 
of the accounts, the clients, example, the 
gentleman, Larry Stewart who was introduced to him 
and he was a co-listing with myself. He was using 
Larry Stewart as a client to pursue our real estate 
and try to close transactions that were in progress 
with Prime, Inc. 
Q. So his knowledge of Larry Stewart? 
A. And transactions that were in process, 
the duplexes he was trying to sell for Larry at the 
time he was with Prime. 
Q. I thought those were sold, 
Stewart-Farnsworth and Stewart-Brenkenridge? 
A. There were others he was working on. 
Q. So by simply knowing the identity of Mr 
Stewart? 
A. No, and the property. 
Q. And the property. Those then became 
information from the files or business? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Is it your company's position that if 
Mr. Mitchell develops any names or leads or 
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1 information while an agent for Prime, that is 
2 Prime's information to be left to Prime? 
3 I A. It is something in my experience in 
4 I working with and working for other brokerage 
5 companies, that the information received and the 
6 clients that are developed during the time you're 
7 with a brokerage company is something that is 
8 discussed and negotiated as part of the final 
9 settlement agreement and separation agreement. And 
10 in every circumstance that I've been involved in and 
11 I other agents that have worked for Prime Commercial 
12 who have come from other brokerage companies, that 
13 information has been deemed of value to that broker 
14 and they have been compensated for a period of time 
15 for that information and for those clients and for 
16 those relationships. 
17 Q. So, you're telling me that Prime, in the 
18 past", when it has acquired or entered into a 
19 J relationship with a new agent, has compensated past 
20 brokers for information? 
21 A. Substantially. 
22 Q. Would that compensation be in the form 
23 J of commissions on transactions closed? 
24 • A. Commissions on transactions that closed 
25 I inwards as to a year or year and a half after they 
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1 leave that brokerage company. 
2 Q. Would they be contracts that were under 
3 I contract? 
4 A. Deals in process, relationships, 
5 period. Example of an agent that came to work for 
6 us to Prime from Consolidated Realty had a 
7 relationship with Pets Mart, had a relationship with 
8 two or three other retailers, and every transaction 
9 that has been consummated by Prime Commercial, we 
10 have paid Consolidated Realty Group a portion of 
11 I that commission. Same thing happened with an agent 
12 from Coldwell Banker. 
13 Q. Is that your understanding then that 
14 that is a function of trade agreement or trade 
15 practice I guess is the word? 
16 MR. KARRENBERG: Insofar as you ask for 
17 a legal conclusion, I'll object. You can answer the 
18 question. 
19 THE WITNESS: Okay. It's in reference 
20 to the contract. It's also in reference --
21 Q. (By Mr. Poole) You just referred to 
22 Exhibit 1? 
23 A. It's Number 1, 11, all listings of 
24 I property, and all employment in connection with the 
25 real estate, and also when you get into discussions 
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1 about all the activity, the information, etc. that 
2 they procure at Prime belongs to Prime as part of 
3 industry practice. What happens is that when an 
4 agent leaves, a certain percentage of his income is 
5 paid to the other broker for a period of time 
6 because these transactions and these relationships 
7 J take a long time to develop. And during that time 
8 I period, that agent is using the overhead, the 
9 offices, the income, the expense of that operation 
10 to procure those relationships. And the time, 
11 I there's so much time spent in developing them that 
12 very often the income comes just prior to, it very 
13 commonly seems to come just prior to when this agent 
14 finds a way to leave. 
15 So, as part of that practice, commercial 
16 real estate brokerage companies throughout the 
17 country that I've been involved with court with each 
18 other in making sure that those separations are 
19 amiable amongst everyone, so if it happens to them, 
20 it happens to us. Everyone's fair. 
21 Q. You've mentioned here that you're 
22 concerned about Mr. Mitchell working with Larry 
23 I Stewart on duplexes that closed after he had left 
24 Prime? 
2 5 A. Uh-huh. 
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Q- At the time that Mr. Mitchell left 
Prime, as to those other duplexes, did Mr. Stewart 
have a listing with Prime? 
A. I believe one of the listings expired 
after he sold it, but I couldn't tell you that 
because I haven't been able to get all the 
information to verify. 
Q. Let's assume for the moment that that 
listing did expire. 
A. Okay. 
Q. By virtue then of the fact that Mr. 
Mitchell may have contacted Mr. Stewart, obtained a 
new listing, that would justify Prime in claiming a 
commission. Is that your position? 
A. That's my position. 
Q. Where in this agreement Exhibit Number 1 
does it allow for that? 
A. I couldn't tell you specifically in 
terms of the -- I can't answer the question. I 
suppose I don't know. 
Q. Do you want to take a minute and look at 
the agreement so you can refresh your memory? 
A. Under section 18 where "Agent shall not, 
after the termination of this Agreement, use to 
Agent's own advantage, or to the advantage of any 
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1 J other person or corporation, any information or 
2 materials gained for or from the files of the 
3 business of Broker." And that would include people, 
4 information, 
5 J Q. Is it your position that if Mr. Stewart 
6 J contacted Mr. Mitchell today and said, "Mr. 
7 Mitchell, I want you and your current broker to list 
8 I a property for me." Would you claim entitlement to 
9 that transaction if it were closed? 
10 J A. By the letter of this agreement, that's 
11 correct. And what I'm trying to tell you, this is 
12 J why you're not listening obviously, because you keep 
13 I coming back to the same question. There's a 
14 practice in brokerage companies. The reason that's 
15 in here is we don't want people to come in and work 
16 for a company and have us expend the cost and energy 
17 and time to pay for an agent to procure a client and 
18 leave and collect a commission thereafter at a 
19 I better brokerage house with a higher commission in 
20 order to take an unfair advantage of that brokerage 
21 company. 
22 And as a part of that, all the other 
23 J reputable brokerage companies, the brokerage 
companies that actually operate a full service 24 
25 j brokerage company and pay a lot of money to do that, 
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have separation agreements. And there is a time 
period where you wind that down so that at one point 
in time, correct, given this situation, if Larry 
Stewart closed on a duplex three months after, six 
months after, yeah, Larry Stewart's commission 
should have come to Prime and Brent Mitchell would 
have received his share based on his split with 
Prime at the time. It would have been in the 
separation agreement. 
Now Pro Active, his now current 
brokerage company, would not have received a share. 
And after a period of time that goes to zero. It's 
a settling out period to let the time go from when 
the cost has been incurred by the brokerage company 
to procure the transaction and then after that time 
period has expired, and really the brokerage company 
now is acting as a broker for that particular agent, 
is spending the money to procure the sales and the 
commissions. So it's just a given way of doing 
business. 
Q. Does Exhibit 1 require Mitchell and 
Prime to sit down at termination and negotiate his 
settlement agreement? 
A. Well, if he doesn't, it goes right back 
to it, then he's not allowed to use any of it, if he 
79 
Kelly Sommerville, R.P.R. 
0 0 0 8 5 5 
1 Q. (By Mr. Poole) You've indicated that 
2 I Mr. Mitchell has used information from the files for 
3 I business consisting of accounts, clients, you 
4 J mentioned the name of Larry Stewart and specific 
5 properties, anything else that you believe or you 
6 contend that Mr. Mitchell gained from the files of 
7 I business for the broker? 
8 J A. Bottom line is that Mr. Mitchell had no 
9 J real estate experience, had no clients, he has my 
10 list, he's probably been continuing to use my list 
11 I of apartment, perspective apartment sellers. I have 
12 a computer generated list that I paid someone to put 
13 together several years ago. I'm assuming he still 
14 has that. More importantly, any information he's 
15 using in real estate, the day he left, unless it was 
16 new information, was information he gained from 
17 being at Prime Commercial. 
18 Q. How do you segregate what he can use and 
19 what he can't? 
20 A. That's why you have a separation 
21 agreement, Dennis. That's exactly why you sit down 
22 and do that so there aren't problems like that. 
23 Q. is it your position that just the 
24 knowledge of the business in terms of filling out an 
25 earnest money, for example, is that something he 
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1 can't do later on? 
2 1 A. Obviously not. 
3 Q. In terms of techniques used in cold 
4 calling, is that something he can't do later on? 
5 A. No. I'm telling you, I'm going to 
6 J repeat it again. The answer to your question is, 
7 everything that would be determined as to what he 
8 can use would be defined in a separation agreement 
9 which we attempted to accomplish. And if he didn't, 
10 J then I don't have an answer to your question because 
11 I don't know. It's something that's negotiated, 
12 I Dennis. 
13 Q. So it's not in your agreement, so it had 
14 to be negotiated at a later date? 
15 MR. KARRENBERG: I'll object. Lack of 
16 foundation, not in the agreement, in the paragraph, 
17 he's already referred to it in paragraph 18. 
18 J MR. POOLE: I'm asking him to tell me 
19 what other materials and files and information were 
20 obtained and you're telling me you don't know. 
21 MR. KARRENBERG: Excuse me. He already 
22 told you what he did know. He also told you he's 
23 waiting to get the information we moved to compel on 
24 J in discovery. 
25 Q. (By Mr. Poole) Is there anything else 
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DENNIS K. POOLE (2625) 
ANDREA NUFFER (6623) 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-3344 
Fax: (801) 263-1010 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : BRENT D. MITCHELL 
vs. : CIVIL NO. 950906465 CV 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a : JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
Corporation, and SALT LAKE 
BOARD OF REALTORS, A Corpor- : 
ation, 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. Apart from my employment as a real estate agent, I am 
also a member and manager of Red Point Equity, L.L.C. ("Red 
Point"), a limited liability company engaged in the business of 
real estate development. 
2. I became a member of Red Point which was organized to 
pursue real estate development activities independent of any Agent-
Broker relationship existing between me and Prime Commercial. 
8 ' A n R 1 9 V- 8: 13 
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3. In 1994, Red Point entered into a joint venture agreement 
with Leonard K. M. Fong ("Fong") for the development of a planned 
unit development on property located on Atwood Boulevard in Murray, 
Utah. 
4. With my assistance, and in furtherance of the joint 
venture agreement, Fong acquired the real property located on 
Atwood Boulevard from unrelated third parties resulting in the 
payment of real estate commissions to Prime Commercial. 
5. As the developer of the project on Atwood and pursuant to 
the terms of the joint venture agreement between Red Point and 
Fong, Red Point was to retain a share of the profits from the 
venture. The profits Red Point was to retain were for Red Point's 
development activities, and not any activities associated with 
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement between me and Prime Commercial. 
6. Fong and I agreed that once the planned unit development 
was completed I, as an agent of Prime Commercial, would market and 
sell the individual units pursuant to a listing agreement the joint 
venture would enter into with Prime Commercial. 
7. Fong subsequently refused to finance construction of the 
planned unit development, thereby breaching the joint venture 
agreement between Fong and Red Point. 
8. As a consequence of Fong's breach, Red Point commenced an 
action in Third District Court entitled Red Point Equities, L.C. v. 
Leonard K.M. Fong, Civil No. 950903430CN. With the filing of the 
Complaint against Fong, Red Point recorded a lis pendens in the 
offices of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
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9. In an attempt to resolve the breach of the joint venture 
agreement and to settle the claims in the above-mentioned litiga-
tion, Fong purchased Red Point's interest in the joint venture for 
approximately $15,000.00. The settlement amount paid was solely 
attributable to Red Point's interest in the joint venture. Neither 
Prime Commercial nor I had a listing agreement to sell any joint 
venture/partnership interest Red Point had in the joint venture 
with Fong. Consequently, no portion of the settlement was for any 
commissions on the sale of the finished or unfinished units. 
10. At the time that Fong purchased Red Point's interest in 
the joint venture agreement, the joint venture had not entered into 
any listing agreements with Prime Commercial for the listing or 
sale of any of the finished units because no development or 
construction had commenced. 
11. On or about the 30th of May, 1995, my attorney received 
a letter from counsel for Prime Commercial which listed five 
properties as known listings which I had procured for Prime 
Commercial prior to my leaving. A copy of this letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A". 
12. Of the above five properties listed on the May 30th 
letter from counsel for Prime Commercial, only three of them were 
listed with Prime Commercial at the time I left. The 6-Plex 
property had been previously sold for which Prime Commercial 
received a commission; and there was no current listing with Prime 
Commercial for that property at the time I terminated my associa-
tion. (Exhibit "A"). Also, I never had a listing agreement with 
MITCH2.AFF (AN) 3 
either Prime Commercial or any other broker for the 1.8 acres in 
West Jordan. 
13. I had no other listings at the time I left Prime 
Commercial. 
14. I received no commissions from any of the three listings 
I had at the time I left Prime Commercial. Each of those listings 
expired before a buyer was located. 
15. Of the three properties for which I had listing agree-
ments with Prime Commercial at the time I left Prime Commercial, I 
have not listed any of those properties with any other broker, nor 
have I collected commissions from any sales of such properties. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this / V day of April, 1996. 
BRENT D. MITCHELL 
ACKNOWLEDGED before me by BRENT D. MITCHELL this / / day of 
April, 1996. 
My Commission Expires: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a 
corporation, and SALT LAKE 
BOARD OF REALTORS, a 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 950906465CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Deposition of: 
BRSUT P, MITCHTO 
Deposition of BRENT D. MITCHELL, taken at the 
instance and request of Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc., at 
the offices of Anderson & Karrenberg, 700 Bank One Tower, 50 
W. Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Wednesday, October 16, 
1996, at 9:55 a.m., before Vicky McDaniel, a Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State 
of Utah, Utah License No. 87-108580. 
* * .* 
10 West Broadway, Suite 200 Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 322-3441 / FAX (801) 322-3443 
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Q Now, you did real estate deals for Mr. Stewart 
who you referred to earlier while you were affiliated with 
Prime Commercial? 
A I represented Larry. I listed some properties 
for him and represented him in the sale of those properties. 
Q And that's while you were affiliated with Prime 
Commercial as an agent? 
A I don't understand. Because of Larry Stewart? 
Q Yeah, while you were an agent affiliated with 
Prime Commercial --
A Yes. 
Q -- you were listing properties for Mr. Stewart? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you close on any of those properties? 
A Yes. 
Q And you also did some real estate deals for 
Mr. Furstenau while you were a real estate agent associated 
with Prime Commercial? 
A Yes. 
Q You also did real estate deals for Mr. Reynolds 
who you referred to while you were a real estate agent 
associated with Prime Commercial; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Let's go back to --
A Rob Reynolds and I had been friends for years. 
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Q -- Exhibit No. 2, if you would. On page 2 it 
refers to certain properties listed. Were those all the 
listings you had at the time you terminated your relationship 
with Prime Commercial? 
A Yes. 
Q Were there any others? 
A No. Some of these weren't even listed. 
Q Which ones were not listed? 
A I did not have a fee agreement on the sixplex. 
There was no agency relationship there. It's just, I knew 
the owner and I knew he -- that at a certain price he would 
be interested in selling. And there was no listing agreement 
there. 
Q The item listed No. 1 on page 2 of Exhibit 2 --
A Right. 
Q -- correct? What other ones? 
A Alta Pines, I had no listing agreement on Alta 
Pines. I just had a relationship with the owner and knew 
that at a certain price he would sell and likely pay a 
commission. But never signed an agency relationship. 
Q And that's item No. 3 on Exhibit 2? 
A Right. Landing Point, I had a fee agreement on 
the 3-1/2 percent single party listing, and the 2.2 acres in 
West Jordan I did not have a fee agreement on and I don't 
believe I did. 
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Q How about No. 2, the 2.5 acres at Alta? 
A I had a fee agreement on that. 
Q Had you done any work in relation to the ones 
that you say you didn't have a fee agreement on, No. 1, 
No. -- what's the other one? 
A That I didn't have a -- at Alta Pines No. 3. 
Q Three, and you said maybe 5? 
MR. POOLE: You said 5, no fee agreement. 
A Yes, I actually -- the number one --
Q Yes. 
A -- while I was at Prime Commercial had sold that 
property to the then present owner for $186,000, and I knew 
that. So I had worked on it previously. So I knew all about 
the property because we purchased it. 
Q So there was stuff in the files at Prime 
Commercial about that property? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Okay. No. 3? 
A No. 3, Alta Pines, I had gathered financial 
information from the owner, income and expense information 
and compiled it on a summary sheet so I could give it to 
potential purchasers. 
Q So that was located in the files of Prime 
Commercial? 
A Uh-huh. 
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Q And who was the owner of Alta Pines at that 
time? 
A The three, all three in question were all owned 
by the same man. 
Q Who is that? 
A Cal Reynolds. 
Q Cal Reynolds is somebody that you had done deals 
for while you were at Prime Commercial? 
A Yes. 
Q And who owned the other two properties? 
A Jack Gordon owned the two and a half acres in 
Alta, and Scott Keller, and I can't remember his partner's 
name, S and K Properties owned Landing Point apartments. 
Q Now, have you done any deals involving 
Mr. Gordon or Mr. Keller or any organizations they're 
associated with since you left Prime Commercial? 
A Mr. Gordon or Mr. Keller, no. 
Q Okay. Did you close on or receive any 
commissions or any remuneration at all in relation to the 
property at Alta or Landing Point? 
A No. 
Q Do you know what happened? Do those properties 
still belong to those gentlemen? 
A Yeah. To my knowledge, they still haven't sold. 
Q Okay. 
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Q Now, No. 13 --
MR. POOLE: Back to Exhibit 8? 
Q Exhibit 8. This lists Larry Stewart-Royalfey-7 
Heritage Home Care, Inc. 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And you were representing both parties or one 
party in that transaction? 
A I was representing Larry Stewart. 
Q And Mr. Stewart was the buyer or the seller? 
A He was the buyer. 
Q And that's the same Mr. Stewart who you had done 
real estate deals for while you were associated with Prime 
Commercial? 
A It is. 
Q And what kind of property was this? 
A It was 2.75 acres of land in Sandy. It was raw 
ground. 
Q Who was the real estate agent on the other side, 
if any? 
A Mardel Topham. 
Q With what brokerage? 
A He's a broker. I don't believe he has a name. 
He's just Mardel. He's an appraiser and a broker. 
Q You indicate in these interrogatory answers you 
have no recollection of when you were first contacted about 
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this transaction or this property; is that correct? 
A Actually, you know, I know about when it was. 
Q When was it? 
A There was a property on Vine Street and about 
5400 South there by the golf course that Larry and I had had 
under contract with some people, and we were going to be 
partners or Larry was going to be partners with these other 
people, and we had become uncomfortable with those other 
people. When we'd gone under contract on that property, I 
can't remember. It was shortly after I left we became 
uncomfortable with it and we decided not to buy that 
property. And there was an earnest money dispute in which we 
let the earnest --it was even --it was actually arbitrated 
by Steve Urry where we, rather than close on the property and 
be partners with these people we weren't comfortable with, we 
chose to walk away from our earnest money. 
So after that had happened I went put to find 
more property for Larry to buy. Larry wanted to buy property 
to build twin homes on. So it was after I had left and 
shortly after Urry and Stewart and I had arbitrated a 
previous contract that I first showed him this property. And 
so to find the date, you talk to Urry, find out what date it 
was we arbitrated, but I can't remember, but it was after I 
had left. 
Q But the previous property, was that some deal 
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you had started with when you were at 
A 
Q 
name of the 
A 
who it was. 
but I 
those 
buyer 
firm. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
don't 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
No- 14, you indicate that 
buyer on that property? 
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Prime Commercial? 
you can't recall the 
Oh, on 127 South Eighth East, yeah, I don't know 
You don't have any records of that --
Well --
-- to know who the buyer 
Proactive property would 
keep it. 
Don't you have access to 
Yeah, if I really tried I 
records. I don't keep them. 
Q 
from 
A 
I'd ask you to supplement 
these records. 
They were represented by 
I guess it doesn't matter what 
does it? 
Q 
determines 
think 
A 
MR. POOLE: Unfortunately 
Are you asking whether or 
is? 
have records on that, 
those records? 
could probably get 
that, the name of the 
another real estate 
I think relevant here, 
, no. 
not you're the one who 
what's relevancy or the judge? 
Well, I know the answer. 
I'm wasting time. 
Q 
Doesn't matter if I 
You indicate in this interrogatory answer that 
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A I think he had five. He did have two in --
okay. Well, I think there's some duo listed. There's an 
error, because it's possible that 14 and 15 are the same one, 
because 19 and --19 and 17 make more sense because he had 
two condos in University Heights. I remembered he had two 
condos in one building. I thought those two were -- but it's 
not it. 
Q Assuming, then, that 14 and 15 really is just 
one event --
A Yeah, I assume, I believe it is. I'm pretty 
sure he only had four condos. 
Q And No. 19 was one of the units that was part of 
that exchange? 
A Yes. 
Q That involved No. 18? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, Mr. Davis, was he the purchaser? 
A Mr. David? 
Q Russell Davis, on No. 19. 
A I have no idea. 
Q You weren't representing Mr. Davis? 
A No, I didn't represent any of the buyers, nor 
did I know them. We just got offers from agents. I did know 
one. Mac Brubaker bought one of the condos. He represented 
himself. So that was one that I remember. I don't remember 
0 0 0 8 8 7 
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Q The one that closed in 1995. 
A Yes. Rob's intention was to do a 1031 exchange 
with the proceeds from that sale into another property, and 
whether it was before or after the closing, but it was 
sometime around there I was working for Rob to find him a 
trade property for the proceeds from that sale, and exactly 
when it was that I first talked to him about this property, I 
don't know. As a real estate -- I want to clarify this --as 
a real estate agent you talk to dozens of people on a regular 
basis about dozens of properties, and, you know, you get 
flyers in your box or in the mail of all kinds of things that 
are for sale. You never remember. 
Q So this No. 23 was also done in connection with 
the 1031 tax free exchange done in connection with the 
Reynolds-Triple K transaction which closed on May 8th, 1995? 
A Yes. 
Q And those are all the transactions that you 
did -- or, excuse me. Let me restate that so we're accurate. 
All of the transactions listed in that interrogatory are the 
transactions you did between January 1st and August 31st, 
January 1st, 1994 and August 31st, 1995? 
A Is August 31st, is that one year from when I 
left? 
Q I just show you, if you look at Exhibit No. 8 
and page 4, the answer even says that those are all listings 
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Douglas E. Grant (#4328) 
Randall E. Grant (#1235) 
GRANT & GRANT 
349 South 200 East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-7777 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendant Prime Commercial, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT D. MITCHELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRIME COMMERCIAL, INC., a 
corporation, and SALT LAKE BOARD OF 
REALTORS, a corporation, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM K. MARTIN 
Civil No. 950906465CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
William K. Martin, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
) 
) ss: 
) 
0 0 0 8 7= 
1. I am the President of CRG Realty, a commercial real estate company in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. I have been a real estate broker involved in the commercial real estate brokerage 
business since 1976. 
2. I have reviewed the agreement of January 1, 1994, between Prime Commercial, 
Inc. and Brent D. Mitchell ("Agreement"), as well as the deposition of Steven Urry taken May 
22, 1996. In addition, I have reviewed the pleadings and discovery responses in this case. 
Finally, I have reviewed the Affidavit of Brent D. Mitchell, wherein he states that he was a 
member and manager of Red Point Equity, L.L.C. ("Red Point"), a company engaged in the 
business of real estate development. Brent Mitchell ("Mitchell") claims that he organized Red 
Point to engage in real estate activities separate from Prime Commercial, Inc. ("Prime"). 
3. However, by entering into the Agreement dated January 1, 1994, with Prime, 
Mitchell agreed that the only real estate business he would do would be to "solicit and obtain 
listings and sales, lease, representation agreements or management contract of property. . . . " 
(Agreement, 14.) Any real estate business Mitchell engaged in beyond soliciting and obtaining 
listings and sales and lease representations, or management contracts, would be in violation of 
paragraph 4 of his Agreement with Prime. However, pursuant to paragraph 11 of the 
Agreement, Mitchell also agreed that any and "all employment in connection with the real estate 
business" would be taken in the name of Prime. 
4. Developing of property and providing services for the development of property 
belonging to another is employment in connection with real estate business. Accordingly, 
Mitchell's employment in development of property should have been taken in the name of Prime. 
2 
Further, because the development of property is real estate business covered by Mitchell's 
Agreement with Prime, Prime would be entitled to a percentage of the proceeds Mitchell earned 
from the development and from his development services. 
5. In paragraph 18 of the Agreement with Prime, Mitchell agreed that he would not 
use any information or materials from Prime for his own personal benefit after leaving Prime. 
Provisions such as paragraph 18 are standard in agency contracts in the commercial real estate 
industry. According to paragraph 18, Mitchell was precluded from using information and 
material gained from Prime for his own advantage. However, in the event that Mitchell did use 
Prime's information or materials, Mitchell was obligated to compensate Prime according to the 
compensation schedule set forth in the Agreement. Such an arrangement is consistent with the 
standard in the commercial real estate industry. 
6. Because Mitchell was provided with extensive support, assistance, aid and training 
by Prime, including providing Mitchell with the names of Prime's clients to contact, it is 
expected that for a period of time after Mitchell left Prime, Mitchell would compensate Prime 
for the benefit he obtained from transactions that were developed during the time he was with 
Prime and developed at Prime's expense. Indeed, especially in the case of a new agent such as 
Mitchell, where such extraordinary support and training was provided, including the 
advancement of funds for an automobile, insurance, real estate licensing dues, and food, it is 
a standard in the commercial real estate industry that a former broker will receive compensation 
for a period of time for commissions generated by the agent after leaving the broker. 
3 
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7. In the commercial real estate industry, it is the standard that an agent split with 
his former broker the commissions he obtains on transactions that occur after his termination for 
approximately one year. 
8. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph 18 of his contract with Prime and the standard 
in the commercial real estate industiy, Mitchell should have provided a portion of his 
commissions earned for one year after he left Prime to Prime especially where Mitchell engaged 
in real estate transactions with individuals or entities who were customers of Prime. 
DATED: May V , 1998. 
William & Martin — — 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ( ^ d a y of May, 1998, by William 
££ Martin. 
My Commission Expires: > l^^AA^cXWt. 
Notay Public 
r ys*zn%^ T Noiary Public 1 
£r-'J^^/ BAP8ARA P. MoGRATH | 
V 7 v . ; - : ~ ^ J \ 175 E. 4C0 S. No. 710 J 
"'", v •'-•' • ^ •-'• Sat? L.-i-s Cffy. Utah 64111 \ 
l
~' V. : ;' :.;' fy.y CC->..:\)KZ\OV. Expires • 
^ ; : ; ^ ' v ?/v 22. e r JO 5 
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as the superior court in its discretion consid-
ers advisable.6 
METCALFE INVESTMENTS, 
INC., Appellant, 
v. 
Linda S. GARRISON, David A. Garrison 
and All Alaska Realestate Investments, 
Inc., Appellees. 
No. S-6772. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
June 28, 1996. 
Real estate brokerage firm brought ac-
tion against former employee, her husband, 
and competitor company which former em-
ployee started. The Superior Court, John 
Reese, J., entered summary judgment for 
company and employee's husband on all 
claims against them and for employee on her 
wage claim, and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, Fabe, J., held that: (1) as a 
matter of first impression, promise to refrain 
from activity, such as using customer lists in 
a new business, for unlimited period of time 
is not subject to the statute of frauds, and (2) 
oral noncompetition agreement of unlimited 
duration did not violate the statute of frauds 
and, thus, was enforceable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error @=>934(1) 
On review of grant of summary judg-
ment, appellate court would review record in 
light most favorable to nonmovant and draw 
all reasonable inferences in its favor. 
6. Given our disposition of the issues in this ap-
peal, it is unnecessary to address McGlothlin's 
claims that the superior court erred in ordering 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>893(1) 
Appellate court reviews trial <* 
grant of summary judgment de novo 
judgment will be affirmed only if no g^ ^ 
issues of material fact exist and movants 
entitled to judgment as a matter of I ^ 
3. Appeal and Error <s»863 
When reviewing grant of summary j u d 
ment, appellate court will consider any nj; 
ter in the record that indicates existence 
genuine issue of material fact 
4. Master and Servant <3=>74, 79 
Trial court has discretion to impose pen 
alty pursuant to statute providing that, if 
employer fails to pay wages due within three 
days of termination, employer may be re* 
quired to pay employee a penalty in the 
amount of employee's regular wage; statute, 
ry penalty is not automatic. AS 23.05.140((i) 
5. Master and Servant <3=>74, 79 
Statute providing that, if employer fails 
to pay wages due within three days of termi-
nation, employer may be required to pay 
employee a penalty in the amount of employ-
ee's regular wage from the time of demand 
to the time of payment or for 90 working 
days, whichever is the lesser amount, is not a 
'treble damages" provision. AS 23.05.140(d). 
6. Judgment <3=> 181(21) 
Material issue of fact as to what the 
parties agreed that employee's bonus would 
be precluded summary judgment for employ-
ee on her claims for back wages and penal-
ties under statute providing that, if employ-
ment is terminated, all wages become due 
immediately and shall be paid within three 
working days after termination and, if not, 
employer may be required to pay employee a 
penalty in the amount of employee's regular 
wage. AS 23.05.140(b, d). 
7. Contracts <s=>9(l) 
Noncompetition agreement was not im-
permissibly vague; evidence indicated that 
employee had agreed not to make use of real 
estate brokerage firm's client list after de-
parting and not to participate in sales to 
that Taylor pay off the reimbursement award in 
installments, and that the superior court erred in 
denying her any award of attorney's fees. 
METCALFE INVESTMENTS, INC- v. GARRISON Alaska 1357 
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potential buyers who had first made contact 
with firm during her employment and non-
competition agreement contained terms 
which were sufficiently well defined. 
8. Contracts <3=>ll7(9) 
Lack of geographical limitation was ir-
relevant because restrictive covenant was not 
blanket prohibition on competition, but rath-
er selective restraint on doing business with 
people who were potential customers of em-
ployer at time of employee's termination and 
thus, the noncompetition agreement was not 
rendered unenforceable by the lack of geo-
graphical or durational limitation. 
9. Contracts <s>117(.5) 
If a business is so large that restraint on 
contacting former clients would amount to a 
bar prohibiting employee from practicing her 
specialty, court will require the restraint to 
be narrowly drafted. 
10. Contracts <^116(1) 
Covenant not to contact former custom-
ers will be unreasonable if the former em-
ployee did not have access to confidential 
information. 
11. Frauds, Statute of ®=>46 
In order for the statute of frauds to 
apply, it must appear that the parties intend-
ed, when they made the contract, that it 
should not be performed within the year. 
AS 9.25.010. 
12. Frauds, Statute of e=>50(2) 
Promise to refrain from activity, such as 
using customer lists in a new business, for 
unlimited period of time is not subject to the 
statute of frauds; rational is that, if promisor 
were to die within one year, the promise not 
to compete would be fully performed. 
13. Frauds, Statute of <©=>50(2) 
Oral noncompetition agreement of un-
limited duration did not violate the statute of 
frauds and, thus, was enforceable. 
14. Contracts <3=>116(1) 
Noncompetition agreement prohibiting 
employee from expropriating information and 
customers that real estate brokerage firm 
had procured at its own expense did not 
violate public policy so as to be unenforcea-
ble. 
15. Judgment $»183 
Employer's tort claims were not proper-
ly before trial court for summary adjudica-
tion since memorandum in support of former 
employee's summary judgment motion never 
mentioned or argued employer's tort claims 
and tort claims were not addressed by either 
party or the court at hearing on the motion 
and thus, it was improper for trial court to 
grant summary judgment on them. Rules 
Civ.Proc., Rule 56. 
Milford H. Knutson, Bledsoe & Knutson, 
Anchorage, for Appellant 
H. Frank Cahill, McNall & Associates, 
P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee Linda S. Gar-
rison. 
Clifford J. Groh, Sr. and Todd J. Timmer-
mans, Groh, Eggers & Price, Anchorage, for 
Appellees David A. Garrison and All Alaska 
Realestate Investments, Inc. 
Before COMPTON, C.J., and 
RABINOWITZ, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH 
and FABE, JJ. 
OPINION 
FABE, Justice. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Metcalfe Investments appeals from the tri-
al court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Linda Garrison, David Garrison, and 
All Alaska Realestate. We conclude that 
there are genuine issues of material fact that 
require us to reverse the grant of summary 
judgment. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
[1] The parties presented contradictory 
versions of the events that culminated in this 
lawsuit. Because Metcalfe Investments op-
posed summary judgment below, we must 
review the record in the light most favorable 
to Metcalfe Investments and draw all reason-
able inferences in its favor. Wilson v. Pollet, 
416 P.2d 381, 383-S4 (Alaska 1966); Charles 
A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 2716, at 643 (1983). For purposes of 
reviewing the trial court's grant of summary 
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judgment, we examine Metcalfe Investments' 
proffered evidence to determine whether it 
raises genuine issues of material fact 
Ray Metcalfe is the president and sole 
shareholder of Metcalfe Investments, Inc., a 
real estate brokerage firm. Metcalfe Invest-
ments specializes in the sale of homes ac-
quired by the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development The company at-
tracts potential buyers with extensive adver-
tising. People who call in response to the 
ads have their names placed on a list of 
people in the Anchorage area who are inter-
ested in purchasing residential property. 
Toward the end of December 1990, Ray 
Metcalfe hired Linda Garrison (Garrison) to 
work for Metcalfe Investments as an inde-
pendent contractor. Metcalfe told her that 
she would be responsible for paying her own 
federal income taxes, social security, work-
ers' compensation, and unemployment insur-
ance. 
Garrison's job was primarily to sell real 
estate for the company. She was to do so 
from the list of names generated by company 
advertising and to add to the list as new 
contacts came into the office. Metcalfe told 
her how the list had been developed and how 
to maintain it. He also asserts that he told 
her that the list was company property and 
that she could not use it or take it with her in 
the event of her departure. 
Metcalfe claims that he instructed Garri-
son that if she left Metcalfe Investments, she 
would receive no commissions on sales made 
to customers she had worked with if those 
sales were completed after her termination. 
Further, she would have to "refrain from 
participating in sales to any potential buyers 
who had made first contact with Metcalfe 
Investments, Inc. during the term of her 
employment" unless Metcalfe granted per-
mission to do so. The division of any com-
missions from transactions in closing at the 
time of her departure would be negotiated 
and subject to agreement between the two of 
them. 
According to Metcalfe, Garrison acknowl-
edged that she fully understood the re-
quirement that she refrain from contacting 
Metcalfe Investments' customers after her 
departure, and she accepted it as a ( w 
tion of her employment While Met^T 
admits that there was no discussion ^ e 
how long this agreement would rem^ 
effect, he assumed that it would last for ^ 
year after Garrison left Metcalfe ln v^e 
ments. He believed that Garrison had 
similar understanding because of the naw 
of the Anchorage real estate market and 
Metcalfe Investments' manner of doin 
business. Garrison denies the existence
 0f 
any such agreement 
While working as an independent contrac. 
tor, Garrison initially was paid solely on a 
commission basis (fifty percent of all commit 
sions). Shortly thereafter, Garrison asked 
Metcalfe to make her a salaried employee so 
that she could have a reliable source of in-
come every month. Metcalfe agreed to pay 
Garrison a salary of $4,800 per month in 
addition to a productivity bonus to be deter-
mined in Metcalfe's discretion. Metcalfe re-
counts that after numerous discussions be-
tween himself, Garrison, and the company 
bookkeeper, it was agreed that Garrison 
would receive as a bonus whatever was left 
over after Metcalfe Investments took its fifty 
percent share of all sales commissions earned 
on property sold as a result of Garrison's 
efforts and covered Garrison's salary of 
$4,800 per month and the costs of having 
made her an employee. These costs included 
workers' compensation, unemployment insur-
ance, all employer's matching funds for social 
security, Medicare and other incidental 
items. 
During the period of negotiations Garrison 
had been receiving her salary of $4,800 plus a 
bonus of a full fifty percent of her sales 
commissions over $9,600. Metcalfe alleges 
that he realized that he had overpaid Garri-
son from February through September based 
on the bonus arrangement which was ulti-
mately devised. Therefore, according to 
Metcalfe, Garrison's subsequent paychecks 
were held to the minimum $4,800 until Met-
calfe Investments recouped the employer's 
share of the taxes and contributions and untQ 
a $4,800 reserve was created to pay her 
salary in a month when she might earn no 
commissions. Garrison denies that she ever 
METCALFE INVESTM1 
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agreed to have her commissions reduced by 
the costs of making her an employee. 
When Metcalfe later hired another em-
ployee to assist Garrison with her adminis-
trative duties, he reduced Garrison's share of 
her commissions from fifty percent to forty 
percent to pay the new employee's wages. 
Metcalfe also deducted certain legal fees 
from Garrison's commissions when a client 
sued Garrison and Metcalfe Investments. 
Metcalfe maintains that Garrison was paid 
all of the salary and bonuses due to her on 
January 15, 1992. Garrison resigned that 
same day. The next day, Garrison opened 
All Alaska Realestate Investments (AAR). 
She placed an ad in the Anchorage Daily 
News classified section announcing the open-
ing of her new office and informing the pub-
lic that she was now with AAR. Garrison 
admits to having notified a few potential 
customers with whom she had been working 
of her new affiliation so that they would have 
a choice of continuing to work with her or 
with another broker at Metcalfe Investments. 
Garrison also claims that when her clients 
called Metcalfe Investments, Metcalfe re-
fused to advise the callers of her new busi-
ness and telephone number. 
Metcalfe alleges that at least five people on 
Metcalfe's list subsequently made purchases 
through AAR in violation of the noncompeti-
tion agreement. Metcalfe also asserts that 
some of these people originally had the prop-
erties shown to them by Metcalfe Invest-
ments employees other than Garrison. 
When Garrison resigned, the reserve ac-
count created in August 1991 held $3,343.10. 
Metcalfe instructed the bookkeeper not to 
pay this amount to Garrison because she had 
taken Metcalfe Investments' customers. 
Garrison claims that she only contacted Met-
calfe Investments' customers with whom she 
had worked personally. 
Garrison filed suit in district court against 
Metcalfe Investments to recover the balance 
of her reserve account and other monies she 
claimed Metcalfe Investments owed to her. 
Metcalfe Investments denied the claim and 
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filed a counterclaim for commissions collect-
ed by Garrison after starting AAR. Approx-
imately eighteen months later, Metcalfe In-
vestments filed a new action in the superior 
court against Garrison, her husband, and 
AAR. This complaint alleged that Garrison 
had breached her employment contract by 
contacting potential buyers from Metcalfe In-
vestments' list, that AAR was unjustly en-
riched when it received commissions that 
should have gone to Metcalfe Investments, 
and that all three defendants intentionally 
interfered with Metcalfe Investments' pro-
spective economic advantage or contractual 
relations. The defendants answered, Garri-
son filed a counterclaim re-asserting the 
claims for unpaid wages, and the cases were 
consolidated in the superior court 
Following preliminary discovery, Garrison 
moved for summary judgment on all issues. 
Garrison's husband, David, and AAR joined 
the motion through their separate counsel. 
Metcalfe Investments opposed summary 
judgment and submitted a number of sup-
porting affidavits, as well as a list of six 
genuine issues of fact which it argued should 
preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
The court found that Garrison was entitled 
to summary judgment on her wage claim and 
awarded her the employer's contribution to 
unemployment insurance ($814.20), social se-
curity and Medicare ($4,920.76), and workers' 
compensation premiums ($1,011.62). The 
court also awarded Garrison $88122 as the 
undisputed balance of the reserve account. 
It awarded Garrison an additional penalty of 
$14,400 for improper withholding of her pay 
under AS 23.05.140(d). The court reserved 
for trial Garrison's claims for reimbursement 
of the deduction for attorney's fees and for 
an unpaid commission on a sale. The court 
denied Metcalfe Investments' contract claim 
on the ground that the noncompetition agree-
ment was too vague to be enforced. Finally, 
the court granted summary judgment to Gar-
rison's husband and AAR on all claims 
against them. 
Final judgment was entered on all issues 
in favor of Garrison, her husband, and AAR.1 
This appeal followed. 
1. Garrison provisionally waived her claim for the a final judgment, 
commission and legal expenses in order to obtain 
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III. DISCUSSIOH 
A. Standard of Review 
[2,3] We review the superior court's 
grant of summary judgment de novo. Niel-
son v. Benton, 903 ?2d 1049, 1052 (Alaska 
1995). The judgment will be affirmed only if 
no genuine issues of material fact exist and 
the moving parties are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Wright v. State, 824 P.2d 
718, 720 (Alaska 1992). We will consider any 
matter in the record that indicates the exis-
tence of a genuine issue of material fact 
American Restaurant Group v. Clark, 889 
P.2d 595, 597-98 (Alaska 1995). Finally, the 
non-moving party is entitled to have the rec-
ord reviewed in the light most favorable to it 
and to have all reasonable inferences drawn 
in its favor. Wilson v. Pollet, 416 P.2d at 
381-84.2 
B. Garrison Is Not Entitled to Summary 
Judgment on Her Claims for Back 
Wages and Penalties. 
[4,5] The court granted Garrison sum-
mary judgment on her claim for back wages 
and awarded her treble damages under AS 
23.05.140(d). While she may prevail on her 
wage claim at trial, she is not entitled to 
2. In its argument before this court, Metcalfe In-
vestments relies upon many facts that were not 
presented to the trial court until after its ruling 
granting summary judgment to Garrison and 
AAR. Garrison argues that this court should not 
consider the affidavits that Metcalfe Investments 
presented for the first time in support of its 
motion for reconsideration of the trial court's 
decision granting summary judgment. Garrison 
cites State Dep't of Natural Resources v. Trans-
america Premier Ins. Co., 856 P.2d 766, 776 
(Alaska 1993) (post-trial affidavit could not be 
considered) and Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 
347 n. 4 (Alaska 1988) (appraisal appended to 
opposition to proposed findings and conclusions 
submitted before final decision made was prop-
erly part of record but could be given no eviden-
tiary value). A number of courts in other juris-
dictions have held that the trial court is not 
required to consider affidavits filed for the first 
time with a motion for reconsideration of a deci-
sion granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Bu-
kulmez v. Hertz Corp., 710 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Colo. 
App.1985) (Civil Rule 56 does not allow for affi-
davits to be filed after court has rendered judg-
ment), rev'd on other grounds, Blue Cross of West-
ern New York v. Bukulmez, 736 P.2d 834, 838-39 
(Colo. 1987); Wells v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 
525 N.E.2d 1127, 1129-30 (III.App.1988) (court 
summary judgment Furthermore,
 AQ 
23.05.140(d) does not support an award 
treble damages.3 
According to Metcalfe, after Garrison K*. 
came a salaried employee, the amount of u 
bonus was to be determined solely ^ J 
discretion. Metcalfe recalls telling Garriso 
that he "promised to be fair" but that hi 
decision would be based upon a number f 
factors, including "costs to the employer re. 
suiting from changing her status to one of 
employee." He alleges that some months 
later, he and Garrison agreed that her bonus-
es would be the net of one-half of commig. 
sions received as a result of her efforts, less 
all the costs of having her as an employee 
including her base salary and "incidental 
costs which the employer was required to 
pay as a result of her status as an employee.'' 
Garrison disputes the nature of the agree-
ment over commissions, claiming among oth-
er things that Metcalfe retroactively reduced 
her commissions. 
Metcalfe does not dispute that the law 
prohibits an employer from deducting the 
employer's share of workers' compensation 
premiums and social security, Medicare, and 
unemployment taxes from an employee's 
wages.4 Wages include commissions and bo-
properly rejected affidavit attached to motion for 
reconsideration). 
We need not reach this issue because Met-
calfe's initial opposition to the motion for sum-
mary judgment included an affidavit containing 
all of the critical allegations regarding the cove-
nant not to compete and Garrison's bonus ar-
rangement. 
3. If Garrison prevails on her wage claim at trial, 
the trial court has the discretion to impose a 
statutory penalty pursuant to AS 23.05.140(d). 
See Klondike Industries Corp. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 
1161, 1171 (Alaska 1987). However, that penal-
ty is not "automatic" as was erroneously argued 
to the trial court by Garrison's counsel. Nor is 
Garrison correct in her characterization of AS 
23.05.140(d) as a "treble damages" provision. 
AS 23.05.140(d) provides that an "employer may 
be required to pay the employee a penalty in the 
amount of the employee's regular wage, salary, 
or other compensation from the time of demand 
to the time of payment, or for 90 working days, 
whichever is the lesser amount" 
4. For example, AS 23.20.165(a) prohibits an em-
ployer from deducting the employer's share of 
unemployment taxes from an employee's wages. 
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noises. See, e.g., AS 23.20.530(a) (defining 
wages as aall remuneration for service from 
whatever source, including . . . commissions 
[and] bonuses."). Garrison argues that Met-
calfe deducted the employer's share of these 
taxes from her commissions, and is therefore 
liable to repay her those amounts. 
According to Metcalfe, the parties agreed 
to a payment plan under which Garrison's 
bonus would be defined as fifty percent of 
her sales commissions less all expenses of 
her being an employee. We cannot say as a 
matter of law that an employer and employee 
may never agree to payment of a discretion-
ary bonus on such a basis. The question of 
whether the parties agreed to payment of a 
discretionary bonus under the terms de-
scribed by Metcalfe cannot be determined on 
summary judgment and will have to be an-
swered at trial. 
[6] Metcalfe Investments has raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to what the 
parties agreed Garrison's bonus would be. 
We must therefore reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment and remand for 
trial so that the jury may determine what the 
salary agreement was and whether it violated 
state or federal law. 
C. Garrison Was Not Entitled to Sum-
mary Judgment on Metcalfe Invest-
ments* Claim that She Violated the 
Covenant Not to Compete. 
The trial court found that the noncompeti-
tion agreement described by Ray Metcalfe 
was too vague to be enforced. 
1. The noncompetition agreement was 
not impermissibly vague. 
[7] The trial court had before it Met-
calfe's version of the agreement, as well as 
supporting affidavits from other Metcalfe In-
vestments employees. This evidence indicat-
ed that Garrison had agreed not to make use 
of Metcalfe Investments' client list after de-
parting and not to participate in sales to 
potential buyers who had first made contact 
with Metcalfe Investments during her em-
Similarly, AS 23.30.245 makes an agreement by 
an employee to pay a portion of workers' com-
pensation premiums invalid, and provides for the 
ployment The evidence, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to Metcalfe Investments, 
indicates that the agreement contained terms 
which were sufficiently well defined, and thus 
Garrison was not entitled to summary judg-
ment on the ground that the agreement was 
too vague. 
2. The noncompetition agreement is not 
void for lack of a geographic or dura-
tional limitation. 
Garrison argues that the noncompetition 
agreement lacked any geographical or dura-
tional limitation. She further claims that 
there is no way for the court to determine 
such limitations, rendering the agreement 
unenforceable. 
[8-10] In Data Management, Inc. v. 
Greene, 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988), we held 
that so long as an overly broad covenant not 
to compete was drafted in good faith, the 
court would make reasonable alterations to 
render it enforceable. Id. at 64-65. Howev-
er, it is not necessary to turn to Data Man-
agement to imply a geographical or duration-
al limitation to the agreement before us, 
because this agreement is enforceable even 
without such limits. This is not the type of 
noncompetition agreement that courts typi-
cally see, limiting a former employee's ability 
to engage in a trade or profession within a 
given area for some period of time. Instead, 
it is an agreement that left Garrison free to 
set up a carbon copy of Metcalfe Investments 
right down the street if she wished. The 
only thing she was prohibited from doing was 
expropriating information and customers that 
Metcalfe Investments had procured at its 
own expense. Thus the lack of a geographi-
cal limitation is irrelevant because the cove-
nant was not a blanket prohibition on compe-
tition, but rather a selective restraint on 
doing business with people who were poten-
tial Metcalfe Investments customers at the 
time of her termination. Such restrictive 
covenants are subject to a less stringent test 
of reasonableness than blanket prohibitions 
of competition. See Restatement (Second) of 
Cmtracts § 188, cmt. g (1981) ("[A] restraint 
imposition of criminal penalties on the employer 
for making such a deduction from the employee's 
pay. 
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is easier to justify . . . if the restraint is 
limited to the taking of his former employer's 
customers as contrasted with competition in 
general"); Corroon & Black of III, Inc. v. 
Magner, 145 IlLApp.3d 151, 98 HLDec. 663, 
671, 494 N.E.2d 785, 793 (1986) (activity re-
straints subject to less stringent test of rea-
sonableness than geographic restraints). We 
conclude that the noncompetition agreement 
is not rendered unenforceable by the lack of 
a geographical or durational limitation. The 
limited scope of the activity restraint is nar-
rowly drawn to protect Metcalfe Invest-
ments' interests in its customer lists.5 
3. The noncompetition agreement does 
not violate the statute of frauds. 
t i l l The question of whether an oral non-
competition agreement of unlimited duration 
violates the statute of frauds is one of first 
impression in Alaska. In Howarth v. First 
National Bank of Anchorage, 540 P.2d 486, 
491 (Alaska 1975), we held that a contract is 
not subject to the statute of frauds if it may 
be fully performed within one year from the 
time it is made. "In order for the statute of 
frauds to apply, it must appear that the 
parties intended, when they made the con-
tract, that it should not be performed within 
the year." Id (citations omitted); see also 
AS 09.25.010. 
In his sworn affidavit, Metcalfe stated that 
there was no discussion of a time limitation 
on the noncompetition agreement; however, 
he assumed it would last for only a year. 
While it appears to be a question of first 
impression in Alaska, it is well-settled else-
where that a promise to forebear or not to 
compete for an indefinite period of time is 
not within the statute of frauds. See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130, 
cmt. b. and illus. 9 (1981) (taking position 
that even promise to forebear for specific 
number of years is not within statute of 
5. This is not to say that all restraints on contact-
ing former customers will be found to be reason-
able. For instance, if a business is so large that 
a restraint on contacting former clients would 
amount to a bar prohibiting the employee from 
practicing his or her specialty, the court will 
require the restraint to be drafted more narrow-
ly. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements 
Not to Compete. 73 Harv.L.Rev. 625, 677 (1960). 
frauds); Arthur L. Corbin, 2 Corbin on Co^ 
tracts § 453, at 568 (1950); Walter H.E. J ^ 
ger, 3 WUliston On Contracts § 495, at ^ 
(3d ed. 1960); 72 AmJur^d Statute
 of 
Frauds § 30 (1974); Hall v. Solomon, 23 ^ 
876, 878 (Conn.1892); Frantz v. Parke, i lx 
Idaho 1005, 1008, 729 ?2d 1068, 1071 (App, 
1986); Hampton u Caldwell, 95 Ark. 337 
129 S.W. 816, 816 (1910); Barash v. Robin. 
son, 142 Wash. 118, 252 P. 680, 683 (1927), 
The rationale for this rule is that if the 
promisor were to die within a year, the 
promise not to compete would be fully per. 
formed. Corbin, supra at 569. A promise to 
forebear from competition is distinguished 
from an affirmative promise, where the con-
tract might well be terminated by death, but 
the performance would still be incomplete. 
M a t 569-70. 
[12,13] We agree with the authorities cit-
ed above that a promise to refrain from an 
activity, such as using customer lists in a new 
business, for an unlimited period of time is 
not subject to the statute of frauds. The 
noncompetition agreement in this case is 
thus enforceable despite the fact that it was 
not in writing. 
4. The noncompetition agreement does 
not injure the public interest 
Garrison argues that any agreement re-
stricting the freedom of real estate purchas-
ers to choose a broker injures the public 
interest. She also notes that because Alaska 
lawyers are prohibited from restraining the 
rights of other lawyers to take clients with 
them if they leave their firms, real estate 
brokers should operate under the same rules. 
See Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 5.6(a). She argues that "a buyer of real 
estate should have the same freedom to 
A covenant not to contact former customers will 
also be unreasonable if the former employee did 
not have access to confidential information. Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 188, illus. 7. If 
the trier of fact finds that a noncompetition 
agreement did exist between Garrison and Met-
calfe Investments, Garrison remains free to chal-
lenge the reasonableness of the restraint on this 
ground. 
jjoose a realtor as a person would have to 
jioose an attorney/' * 
Covenants not to compete for real estate 
okers have been found to be enforceable 
ad unenforceable, depending upon the facts 
the case.7 Covenants have been struck 
jown because they were too broad in time 
scope or because there were no trade 
ets or threats of unfair competition in-
Dived, but never because noncompetition 
aents for real estate brokers amounted 
a per se injury to the public interest See 
cited supra, note 7. 
[14] Garrison has provided us with no 
persuasive reason or legal precedent for her 
proposition that this covenant not to compete 
constitutes a violation of public policy. Ac-
cordingly, we find that such an agreement 
| does not injure the public interest8 
We conclude that there are genuine issues 
of material fact that remain to be resolved 
I regarding the covenant not to compete, both 
1 as to its existence and as to its terms. Tak-
\ ing the facts as Metcalfe Investments alleges, 
Garrison is not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on this question. 
6. Courts have upheld covenants not to compete 
when applied to doctors on many occasions. See 
Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and 
Construction of Contractual Restrictions on Right 
of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to 
Employment Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 1014 (1975). 
7. See Rector-Philhps-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 
Ark. 750, 489 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1973) (refusing to 
enforce covenant not to compete for three years 
in employer's county where there was no evi-
dence employee attempted to use employer's 
confidential information); Welles v. OConnell, 
23 Conn.Supp. 335, 183 A.2d 287, 288-89 (1962) 
(upholding covenant not to compete within town 
for two years); Dalrymple v. Hagood, 246 Ga. 
235, 271 S.E.2d 149,' 150-51 (1980) (upholding 
covenant not to compete in same county for 
three years); Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Pike, 226 Ga. 
131, 172 S E.2d 676, 678 (1970) (upholding cov-
enant not to compete within the county for eigh-
teen months); Vander Werfv. Zumca Realty Co., 
59 lU.App.2d 173, 208 N.E.2d 74, 77 (1965) 
(striking covenant not to compete for two years 
within five miles of employer's offices where no 
trade secrets involved and no client enticement 
occurred); Blackwell v. E.M. Helides, Jr., Inc., 
368 Mass. 225, 331 N E.2d 54, 56 (1975) (up-
holding covenant not to compete for three years 
m multiple towns where employee had access to 
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D. Garrison Was Not Entitled to Sum-
mary Judgment on Metcalfe Invest-
merits' Tort Claims. 
In her motion for summary judgment, Gar-
rison moved "for an order granting her sum-
mary judgment on her claim for wages due 
and on claims brought against her by Met-
calfe Investments, Inc." In her supporting 
memorandum, Garrison's counsel framed 
only two issues for resolution: 
This consolidated action concerns a sin-
gle dispute . . . regarding Garrison's claim 
for unpaid wages and Metcalfe Invest-
ment's [sic] counterclaim for damages re-
sulting from Garrison's alleged breach of 
an oral employment contract 
The memorandum in support of Garrison's 
motion never mentioned nor argued Metcalfe 
Investments' tort claims. When AAR joined 
the motion for summary judgment, it too 
failed to specifically address the tort claims. 
When Metcalfe Investments filed its opposi-
tion, the briefing again only addressed Garri-
son's claims for back wages and the noncom-
petition agreement The tort claims were 
not addressed by any party or the court at 
the July 13, 1994 hearing on the motion. 
files with confidential information on properties 
not available to public); Abramson v. Blackman, 
340 Mass. 714, 166 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1960) 
(striking covenant not to use information from 
employer's files or information gamed verbally 
for indefinite period); Dunfey Realty Co. v. £n-
wnght, 101 N.H. 195, 138 A.2d 80, 82-83 (1957) 
(refusing to uphold covenant not to compete for 
three vears within local area); Steinfeld v. Hau~ 
sen, 180 Misc. 295, 40 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684 (Sup. 
1943) (upholding covenant not to compete for 
one year within twenty square blocks from em-
plover's office), modified, 269 A.D. 336, 55 
N.Y.S.2d 722 (App.Dep't 1945); Cohen Realty, 
Inc v. Mannick, 817 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla.App. 
1991) (refusing to enforce covenant that con-
tamed no limit on geography and too long a time 
limit); Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W.Va. 
605, 73 S.E.2d 438, 443 (1952) (striking cove-
nant not to compete for one year without territo-
rial limits). 
8. Gamson also makes a claim that she could 
have been violating state law if she refused to 
work with a buyer because of the noncompetition 
agreement. She cites provisions prohibiting dis-
crimination in housing on the basis of race, sex, 
and disability. See AS 18.80.240(1) and 12 AAC 
64 130(19) It is difficult to see how her compli-
ance with the noncompetition agreement would 
cause her to violate Alaska's housing discrimina-
tion laws. 
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[15] Based on this record, we conclude 
that Metcalfe Investments' tort claims were 
not properly before the trial court for sum-
mary adjudication. Our Civil Rules require 
the moving party to file with a motion for 
summary judgment "a memorandum showing 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(c). Garrison and AAR 
did not even attempt to do so on Metcalfe 
Investments' tort claims. While they did 
include language in their motion that indicat-
ed they sought summary judgment on all 
issues, Rule 56(c) places on the moving party 
the burden of proving that there is no issue 
of material fact and entitlement to judgment 
as a matter of law. Indeed, Rule 56(e) states 
that: 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this 
rule . . . the adverse party's response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). 
Only after the moving party meets this 
burden is the nonmoving party obligated to 
demonstrate the existence of genuine materi-
al factual disputes or that the moving party 
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Alaska R.Civ.P. 56(e). Because Garri-
son and AAR never met this initial burden as 
to the tort claims, it was improper for the 
trial court to grant summary judgment on 
them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because of our resolution of these issues, it 
is not necessary to reach the other errors 
asserted by the parties in this appeal. The 
judgment of the trial court is REVERSED 
and REMANDED for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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1. Constitutional Law <s=>258(2) 
Criminal statute violates due process 
when it is so vague that men of common 
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meaning and differ as to its application. 
U.S.CJL ConstAmend. 14. 
2. Fish <s»15 
Charge alleging that defendant fished 
with gillnet containing inadequate mesh size 
was not void for vagueness; definition of 
"stretched measure" in regulation described 
reasonably accurate way of determining 
mesh size either before or after fishing, and 
defendant failed to demonstrate why he could 
not have proceeded with exact method of 
measurement specified in challenged regula-
tion prior to fishing with net U.S.CJL 
Const.Amend. 14; Alaska Admin. Code title 
5, §§ 27.131(f), 39.975(11). 
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Motorist may be convicted of driving 
while intoxicated (DWI) for driving with 
blood-alcohol level in excess of specific limit, 
even though no precise method of determin-
ing blood-alcohol content is readily available 
to driver until postarrest breath test is ad-
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Defendant who is moving to dismiss 
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